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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF FRANCHISING
The following study was conducted in an effort to see
what had, or had not changed in the franchising industry
from the time the original study concluded in 1973.

The

original study was conducted by Dr. Gerald G. Udell, who
identified 158 contractual provisions as a basis in com
paring franchise contracts.

This comparison identified the

presence of the provisions, and questioned the fairness in
the franchisor's application of the provisions.

This fol

low-up study consists of reviewing published literature of
the original study, and conducting a survey similar to find
out what had changed in the interim years.
Franchising's origin actually began during the Middle
Ages.

Historically, kings and noblemen granted fiefs land

to live and farm on.

In return, the fiefs provided revenue

from the sale of their crops, and in war, the fiefs would
serve as loyal troops.

This practice ended in 1562 with the

enactment of the Council of Trent, but the basic idea of
franchising had been established.
Franchising came to America in 1496, when King Henry
VII granted Giovanni Caboto (John Cabot) and sons the
following:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

We have given and granted to them, their heires and
deputies, that all the firme lands, isles, villages,
townes, castles, and places whatsoever they be that
they shall chance to finde, may not of any other of our
subjects be frequented or visited without the license
of the foresayd John and his sonnes...
Modern franchising began prior to the end of the Civil
War when Singer Sewing Machine Company chose franchising as
a method of distribution.^

As time passed, more business

persons used this method of distribution and company names
became well known throughout the country.

Examples of

companies include Rexall Drugs, General Motors, and Pepsi
Cola.
Problems in Franchising
Since World War II, America has experienced exponential
growth in business enterprises.^

With this growth came

problems in fair trade, fair wages, business ethics and
generally deciding what was good for the franchising
industry.
To give the reader some idea how big this industry is,
the following is a list of the five largest franchise res
taurant chains and their sales in 1986 and 1987.
1986 SALES
fin billions!

FRANCHISE
1.

McDonald's

2.

1987 SALES
fin billions!

$12.4

$14.3

Burger King

5.0

5.6

3.

Kentucky Fried

3.5

4.1

4.

Hardee's

2.7

3.0

5.

Wendy's

2.7

2.8

Source: Harriet C. Johnson, "Franchise Industry
Hungers for Fast Food". fUSA TODAY. 11 February 1988
ed.), p. 8B.
2
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According to the 1987 Commerce Department report, sales
at fast food establishments are expected to grow more than
11 percent in 1990.

They also estimate that 91,000 fran

chised restaurants will operate in 1988, up 9.2 percent from
the 83,331 figure in 1987.
Franchised businesses grew rapidly, and with this
growth came indecision, confusion, chaos and contradiction
on how to own and operate a franchised business that met
standards of fairness.

Because of the rapid growth and

relative newness of this industry, many opportunities for
unfair practices in the daily transactions between fran
chisor and franchisee existed.
As Dr. Gerald G. Udell stated in a research article,
titled, "The Franchise Agreement Handbook".
...franchising represents a compromise between the
franchisee's desire for independence and his desire for
security (risk reduction).
To a degree, these desires
are incompatible and mutually exclusive".''
Because the relationship between these two elements of
security and independence may not be adequately understood
by the franchisee, he may be easily deceived by a one-sided
franchise agreement.

In defining a one-sided franchise

agreement, the reader should envision two tribes coexisting
on an island.

Tribe one, the franchisor, is armed with guns

and ammunition, and tribe two, the franchisee, is armed with
spears and knives.

Because tribe one has superior weaponry,

it is able to impose its will upon tribe two.

This imposi

tion can produce fear, confusion and a rebellious attitude.
In the end, neither party may be well served.
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The one-sided franchise agreement brought much
attention to the small business community in 1970.

Speaking

before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee with a prepared text,
Harold Brown, a critic of franchising, testified as follows:
There is a marked, intentional, and constantly
emphasized disparity in the positions of the parties—
the franchisor combining the roles of father, teacher,
and drill sergeant, with the franchisee relegated to
those of son, pupil, and buck-private, respectively . .
. . control is buttressed by the contractual require
ment that the franchisee must obey the commands of the
operating manual as expounded by the franchisor's
supervisor, on pain of losing the franchise if he
disobeys them and under constant threat of such ter
mination.^
And upon termination, or failure to renew the franchise
contract, the franchisee is often confronted with the
covenant to compete and forfeiture of his equity in the
business.
What Harold Brown said to that 1970 U.S. Senate
Subcommittee is the essence of what troubles most potential
franchisees.

As Mr. Brown indicated, if one could obtain an

operating manual, one would often find stipulations within
that are dubious in nature or in favor of the franchisor.*
These types of practices have led to many supposedly sig
nificant changes in the franchising industry.
To further examine possible changes in the franchise
industry, a hypothesis was formed to determine whether
nationally known fast food franchises were being over
controlled through numerous contract provisions when com
pared to regionally known fast food franchises.
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The remainder of this paper contains:

Chapter 2, which

reviews the previous study in franchise contractual
agreements in 1973 by Dr. Gerald Udell.

Chapter 3 is a

presentation of a present day study in franchise agreements
conducted in 1988.

Chapter 4 discusses the results of the

present day study.

Chapter 5 is a summary of the research

and the results.
In addition, there are three appendices.

Appendix I

defines and lists the contractual provisions used in the
research.

Appendix II is an illustration of a letter solic

iting franchisor support of the research.

Appendix III

compares the numerical occurrence of each provision from the
original study versus the present day study.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In 1973, Dr. Gerald G. Udell conducted extensive
research into the fairness of contractual agreements between
franchisors and franchisees in an effort to aid those who
seek to understand the franchise agreement and its inter
relationship between franchisors and franchisees.
Dr. Udell used the following four phases to conduct his
research:
Phase 1.

Solicit franchise agreements

Requests were mailed to franchisors soliciting a copy
of the contracts they used to conduct business.
groups of franchise system were solicited.

Three

They were fast

foods, convenience food stores, and coin-operated laundries.
One hundred forty-three contracts were received from the
three groups.

Of those contracts received, one hundred

twenty-two were from the fast food franchisors.^

The

remaining contracts were from the laundries and convenience
stores.
Aside from the three groups mentioned above, there were
approximately 400 other franchised systems that could be
grouped into sixty franchise industries.

From these
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franchise systems, one hundred franchisors were solicited
for contracts, only sixteen were received.

Thirteen

contracts were obtained from other sources, and ten were
received after the analysis had been completed, making the
total number of contracts observed to be one hundred eightytwo .*
Phase 2.

Contract analysis and classification of elements.

In this phase, each contract was analyzed to identify
the contract elements it contained.

The provisions in each

contract were entered into a log and were grouped based upon
commonality (i.e. advertising, supplies).
These provisions can be further combined into several
sections ;
Section 1 is concerned with payments to franchisors,
indirect payments, special payments, penalties, security
deposit, and termination penalties.
Section 2 discusses general contract provisions.

This

includes length of contract terms, option to renew, exclu
sive territory, start-up date, franchisor confidential
disclosure, franchisee confidential disclosure, independent
contractor, hold harmless, act of God, no waiver of default,
illegal covenant, legal business, franchisee association
forbidden, right to future revision, operating manual,
goodwill payments, correction of deficiency, compliance with
local laws, franchise disability, arbitration, and site
selection.
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Section 3 deals with miscellaneous contract provisions.
It covers incorporation permitted, trademark restrictions,
distinctive architecture, ethical behavior, state of inter
pretation, venue clause, sub-franchising, civil rights, full
time, competitive business, restriction on sale of goods,
product service, sales quota, and guaranteed sales.
Section 4 concerns provisions of uniformity.

This

outlines physical layout, local variations permitted, days
open, hours open, product line, price control, and altera
tion approval.
Section 5 discusses provisions of occupancy.

This

includes franchisee ownership, franchisor ownership, fran
chisee lease, franchisor lease, lease approval, notice of
non-compliance, lease back, lease loss.
Section 6 covers obligations of the franchisor.

This

section outlines the franchisor's obligations to analyze
reports, to advertise, to account for advertising funds, to
advise and consult, inspect, advise franchisee of changes,
and grand opening assistance.
Section 7 describes bookkeeping provisions which
includes bank approval, bookkeeping system approval, fran
chisor's bookkeeping system required, annual certified
audit, right to audit books, margin of error, federal income
tax copy, periodic reports, cash withdrawal, and profit
withdrawal.
Section 8 elaborates on employee conduct and training.
Covered in this section are employee uniforms, employee

8
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conduct, number of employees, right to hire and fire, fran
chisee formal training, refresher course, training of sub
sequent managers, training of key employees, all employee
training, and on-the-job training and assistance.
Section 9 defines insurance provisions that deal with
franchisor administration, franchisor co-insured, cancella
tion notice, approval of franchisee's insurance company,
proof of insurance, and the different types of insurance to
include; business interruption, workers' compensation,
personal, employer liability, product liability, and
property liability.
Section 10 discusses purchasing provisions which
involves the franchisee's purchase of paper goods, operating
supplies and services, equipment, signs, price restriction,
franchisor/vendor rebate, and vending approval.
Section 11 provides insight to provisions of adver
tising.

This covers franchisor/franchisee advertising, the

franchisor's right to enter and destroy, requirements for
signs, the franchisor's approval of advertising, and adver
tising association or committee.
Section 12 covers the provisions in franchise termina
tion and sale.

This section discusses the franchisor's

right of first approval, the franchisee's right of first
refusal, the right of inheritance, the franchisor's approval
of sale, no "for sale" advertising, binding upon successors,
stock transfer approval, and no goodwill payments.
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Section 13 discusses the terms of termination.

These

terras are failure to pay, franchisee/franchisor right to
early termination, termination for any violation, termina
tion for bankruptcy, training failure or violation of stan
dards, immediate cancellation, and grace periods.
Section 14 provides for the franchisee's obligation
after termination.

These provisions are described in a

series of covenants.

There are covenants not to compete,

not to hire, not to use the franchise system, cease opera
tions, change the building, remove signs, and paying the
cost of enforcing these covenants should the franchisee
refuse to comply.
Finally, section 15 outlines the provisions for sale
after the termination of the franchised business.

These

provisions describe the procedures used by the franchisor in
a buy back of assets from the former franchisee.
To ensure the contracts collected were a representation
of the industry's franchise agreements, three steps were
taken :
1.

A review of the literature was made to identify
additional provisions.

2.

A test of redundancy was used to determine whether or
not a sufficient amount of contracts were gathered from
each major group.

3.

Panel members in the research were asked during the
third phase to mention any provisions not previously
listed.

10
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The use of three independent steps, provided a check on the
accuracy and completeness of the franchise agreement
analysis.’
Phase 3.

Review Elements with the Panel of Experts,

Franchisors, and Franchisees.
In this phase, a panel reviewed each contractual
element to:

1) expand the knowledge about the elements by

including the experiences of the other panel members; 2)
ensure correct interpretation; 3) judge each provision in
terms of importance, equitable nature, and legality; and 4)
reduce the number of contractual elements to a manageable
number.
The panel consisted of twenty-nine franchisors, fran
chisees, franchise consultants, franchise lawyers, represen
tatives of franchise associations, and several state and
federal agencies interested in franchising.^^
In order to select criteria to be used by the panel
during this phase, a total of ten questions were reviewed by
a small group consisting of two franchisors, two
franchisees, and two faculty members.

The ten questions are

paraphrased below:
1.

Is the provision of importance

to either

2.

Is it essential?

3.

Does it create the opportunity for

party?

fraud or unfair

advantage?
4.

Are the demands reasonable?

5.

Is the clause enforceable?
11
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6.

Does it protect the interests of both parties?

7.

Is the provision ethical?

8.

Are payments and penalties fair and earned?

9.

Does the contract element protect the interests of both
parties?

10.

Does the provision favor one party or the other?

Phase 4.

Mail Survey of Franchisors and Franchisees.

Surveys were mailed to two hundred sixty-nine fran
chisors, two hundred thirty-four franchisees, and seventyfive franchise experts, which included franchise consul
tants, lawyers, authors, trade journal editors/publishers,
and federal and state agencies.
A total of 588 questionnaires were mailed.
surveys sent out, only 160 were returned.

Of the 588

Twelve of these

were returned too late, thus reducing the sample size to
140.

Half of the participants in the survey were chosen

from a national, randomly selected, sample of telephone
books.

The other half was selected from telephone books in

the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana.

The men

tioned states were chosen because they were in close
proximity to the research site, thus allowing the
researchers ample opportunities to conduct interviews with
the participants without traveling great distances.
Wherein a true random sample would provide more
validity, the previous study did note that a true random
sample selection of the franchise industry was virtually
impossible due to the unavailability of a list of
12
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franchises.

However, it was estimated that there were

500,000 franchises in the United States, with 50,000 new
franchise businesses being formed each year
Phase 5.

Analysis of Contract Elements.

In this phase, personal interviews were conducted in
the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Washington,
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Michigan.

The results from the

previous four phases and the interviews were incorporated
into a composite analysis.
In summarizing the results of Dr. Udell's study, it was
revealed that the franchise agreement plays a major role in
the relationship between franchisor and franchisee.

The

results also revealed that much of the unfairness in fran
chising is found in the franchise agreement.

A paraphrased

definition of an unfair provision provided by the initial
study can be stated as a provision that does not offer the
franchisee the same basic rights as extended to the fran
chisor.

Additionally, an unfair provision can be used to

manipulate or force the franchisee to perform in a way that
may not be conducive for a healthy or profitable business,
but it provides larger payments or profits to the
franchisor.
Most contracts were one-sided in favor of the fran
chisor, giving rise to unfair franchisee - franchisor rela
tionship.

As an example of the one-sided relationship, the

examining panel did not find one contract that dealt with

13
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franchisor's non-performance.

The franchisee could,

however, heavily penalized or terminated for non
performance.
There were clauses that created situations whereby the
franchisor could benefit financially by treating the fran
chisee unfairly.

As examples, there were provisions

requiring the franchisee to purchase standard goods or
material from specified sources, termination or heavy penal
ties should the franchisee commit the slightest deviation
from contract provisions, or the presence of unreasonable
rates of depreciation.
According to Dr. Udell, provisions of this nature
create incentives for unfair treatment of the franchisee by
the unethical franchisor.
Despite the results mentioned above, the panel did find
many ethical franchisors who were diligently trying to
provide good services to the franchisees.
Phase 3 found that in the long run, some provisions
such as those found during the study, opened the door to
unfair treatment of the franchisee.

Furthermore, many of

the provisions were questionable in ethics and legality.
The panel also found that many provisions contributed to
suspicion, mistrust, and could be removed or rewritten with
little effect on the franchise contract.
Depicted in Table 1 are the sections previously dis
cussed.

The table also gives the number of provisions each

section contains and also indicates the number of provisions
14
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found to be unfair.

The following chapter will identify and

discuss the unfair provisions from each section.
In cross-referencing the information in the initial
study with current literature, the author did not find any
material that performed research or gathered data as the
initial study.

What was gained from the cross-reference was

a different insight to franchising as it appears to others.

15
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TABLE 1
Key Concerns Identified in the Previous Research

Section

No. of
Provisions
in section

Contract Provisions

No. of
Unfair
Provisions
in section

1.

Payments to the
Franchisor.

15

4

2.

General Contract
Provisions.

21

4

3.

Miscellaneous Contract
Provisions.

14

0

4.

Provisions of Uniformity.

7

2

5.

Provisions of Occupancy.

8

2

6.

Obligations of the
Franchisor.

7

0

7.

Bookkeeping Provisions.

10

1

8.

Employee Conduct and
Training.

10

2

9.

Insurance Provisions.

11

1

10.

Purchasing Provisions.

17

4

11.

Provisions of Advertising.

5

1

12.

Provisions in Franchise
Termination and Sale.

10

1

13.

Terms of Termination.

11

4

14.

Franchisee's Obligation
After Termination.

8

2

15.

Provisions for Sale After
the Termination.

16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 3
PRESENT STUDY
This study was designed to follow up on Dr. Udell's
research.

It was conducted beginning in November, 1987, and

ending in January, 1988.

The purpose of the follow-up

research was to determine the changes in franchise contract
provisions during the past fifteen years.
Since the majority of franchise contracts received in
the Udell study were from fast food franchised businesses,
67 percent (122 out of 182), it was decided that the followup study would focus only on the fast food franchise con
tracts.

If significant changes were identified in this

industry, then other industries could be looked at as well.
Scope of Research
Primary research was limited to the data from the
franchise contracts received from each franchise home
office.

Secondary data was drawn from Mr. Terry Sutton, who

has been a manager at two nationally known fast food
franchises, and from Dr. Udell, who is a member of the
faculty at the University of North Dakota in Grand Forks,
North Dakota.
The research procedures used in the follow-up study are
a derivative of those used in 1973 by Dr. Udell.

The judg

mental criteria in determining a fair or unfair provision
17
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were abstracted from the analysis of the initial study and
were used in the present study.

A paraphrased definition

of an unfair provision provided by the initial study can be
stated as a provision that does not offer the franchisee the
same basic rights as extended to the franchisor.

Addition

ally, an unfair provision can be used to manipulate or force
the franchisee to perform in a way that may not be conducive
for healthy or profitable business, but it provides larger
payments, or profits to the franchisor.
Research Procedures
Franchise contracts were requested from the fran
chisors.

In keeping the research manageable, one hundred

letters were mailed to franchisors requesting copies of
contracts they used in starting new franchisees in their
systems.

The one hundred franchisors selected to receive

the letters requesting copies were obtained from a listing
of franchise businesses Dr. Udell kept current.

This list

included those franchises from the previous study that are
still in business today and franchises that have come into
existence since that time.
The selection process divided the franchisors into two
categories:

(1) nationally known franchises and (2) region

ally known franchises.

A nationally known franchise is

defined as a franchise system that is recognized by U.S.
consumers from coast to coast.

A regionally known franchise

is not known nationally, but it may be quite prevalent in a
particular region of the United States.
18
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Each category contained fifty franchisors.

The selection of

franchise systems in each category was by personal
recognition and random choice.

The intent of categorizing

was to try to obtain equal amounts of contracts from both
large and small franchise systems in an effort to determine
whether large franchises include more provisions in their
contracts when compared to the smaller franchise systems.
The letters requesting copies of the contracts were
mailed at the beginning of November, 1987.
letter can be found in Appendix II.

A copy of the

Of the one hundred

contracts requested, only twenty-six were

received by the

end of the second week of February, 1988.
In the next phase, each contract was

reviewed to see if

it contained some, or all of the 158 provisions outlined in
Chapter 2.

To record the presence of the provisions, a

tally sheet was used.

After making the appropriate annota

tions to the tally sheet, the marks in each category of
provisions were summed to determine the frequency of its
occurrence in the collective group of the twenty-six con
tracts.

This frequency of occurrence is shown in Appendix

III.
In addition to finding the frequency of occurrence of
each provision, the twenty-six contracts were redefined into
two categories of (1) nationally known, and (2) regional
franchises.
In this study, the franchises were evenly distributed
with thirteen contracts in each category.

19
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It was hypothesized that national franchises may be
overcontrolling their systems by using large numbers of
provisions in their contracts when compared to the number of
provisions found in the regional franchises.

This hypo

thesis was tested by totalling the provisions in each con
tract to produce a cumulative sum for each category.

A

comparison of the cumulative sum of each category would be
made to determine the accuracy of the hypothesis.

20
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CHAPTER 4
FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH RESULTS
The receipt of twenty-six contracts out of the one
hundred requested, was somewhat of a disappointment.

The

non-responding franchises were either very large and well
known, or very regional in their existence.

Eleven of the

non-respondents had very large franchise systems, and the
remaining sixty-four were regional.
Wherein only twenty-six contracts were received, ten of
the twenty-six franchises had participated in the original
study.

The author felt that this would provide ideal data

to assess possible change in the contracts employed in
franchising.

To negate any bias analysis, contracts from

the ten franchises that participated in the original study
were not compared to contracts received in the present
study.
Provisions in the contracts received from the fran
chisors were compared with the same provisions in
Dr. Udell's original study.

The provisions were compared to

ascertain any changes in the terms used in the wording of
the provision.

it was noted that contracts from the current

and previous study used large portions of legal terminology
in their contracts.

All of the contracts contained legal

terms in one form or another.

However, ten of the thirteen

21
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less known franchise contracts had legal terminology that
was difficult to comprehend, and they probably require the
assistance of a lawyer to decipher their meaning.

This is

not to say that the other sixteen contracts did not have
terms that were difficult to comprehend.

Rather it iden

tifies those ten contracts as having a substantial amount of
legal terms that may mislead, or confuse a franchisee as to
what performance is expected from him, or from the
franchisor.
Understanding legal terminology was not the only
barrier in comprehending the contract.

Three of the ten

contracts possessing large amounts of legal terms, also had
provisions in small print.

The small print was located

about halfway through the contract in two instances.

The

entire print in the third contract was small and hard to
read.

The comparison also included reidentifying provisions

that were considered unfair in the original study.

While 15

percent (23 of 158) of the provisions in the original study
would definitely be considered unfair, many of the remaining
135 provisions have the potential of being unfair if used to
impose the absolute will of the franchisor.
À comparison was made with the 1973 study to see if the
follow-up study would have significant differences in the
prevalence of the provision.
results.

This comparison yielded mixed

The comparison resulted in some provisions having

a range of very little to large difference in occurrence.
Of the provisions that were significantly less, 16 percent

22
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were unfair.

Of the provisions that were significantly

more, 12 percent were unfair.

Of the provisions that were

unchanged, 25 percent were unfair.

The comparison can be

seen in Figure 1 at the end of this chapter.
Unfair Provisions
In the original study, 15 percent of the provisions
used were considered unfair or had the potential of being
unfair.

The present study identified five provisions that

enhanced opportunities for unfair treatment.
provisions were;

The five

Operating Manual, Lease Back, Franchisor's

inspection. Operating Supplies-Must Buy, and Termination for
any Violation.

Each provision is shown in Appendix I.

The

provision for the operating manual binds the franchisee to
the contents inside of the manual.

At no time is the fran

chisee allowed to review the manual prior to signing the
franchise contract.

In several provisions, there is refer

ence to possible additional requirements as specified in the
operating manual.

It is possible to conclude that this

condition could produce unknown hardships upon the
franchisee.

The author was unable to obtain an operating

manual, but information from conversations with a former
manager of a Burger King and McDonald's, indicated the
operating manual contains very explicit instructions as to
how the franchised store is to be operated.

It was said

that the manual would probably be the best contract the
franchisor could use.

It would provide a wealth of inform

ation as to what performance is expected of the franchisee,
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and what services the franchisee can expect from the
franchisor.
The lease back provision specifies that if a franchisee
leases or owns the property he operates his business from,
that franchisee must assign or lease the property to the
franchisor.

In the original study there were some fran

chisors who required this type of subleasing as collateral
for faithful performance.

This provision gives the fran

chisor a large tool in which he may threaten to evict the
franchisee, thereby coercing the franchisee into performance
dictated by the franchisor.

Furthermore, if the franchisee

owns the land and is forced from the business, the fran
chisor retains the lease for the specified period of time,
and can operate the franchise business until the end of the
lease.

The original study identified this as being one of

the most unfair provisions.
The inspection of a franchise facility is an undoubted
right of every franchisor.

The inspections are a means of

ensuring equipment, cleanliness, and proper standards are
adhered to.

These inspections give the franchisor the right

to remove from the premises any supplies or equipment for
the purpose of testing standards or quality.

If equipment

is broken during this testing, it is the franchisee who has
to pay for repairs or replacement.

There are no limits as

to how many times a franchisor can remove items from the
operating facility.

Contracts that contained this provision

did not specify the franchisor's responsibility in sharing
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repair and replacement costs.
All franchised businesses require operating supplies to
function successfully.

Purchasing supplies in the franchise

restaurant business can be done through the franchisor, or
from an independent distributor.

To purchase supplies from

an independent distributor, the supplies must meet quality
standards met by the franchisor.

If these standards are too

high, the franchisee may be forced to buy his supplies from
the franchisor.

In a must buy situation, the franchisee is

not given the opportunity to seek a distributor for
supplies.

Instead, he must buy all his supplies directly

from the franchisor or through a distributor specified by
the franchisor.

This situation gives the franchisor com

plete control in pricing the supplies sold to the
franchisee.

If the franchisee purchases through an

appointed distributor, a surplus charge may be made so that
the distributor may give a kickback payment to the fran
chisor for the business rendered unto him.

There can be

situations wherein this provision is enforced to maintain
quality supplies with reasonable prices for supplies.
The termination for any violation provision gives the
franchisor the opportunity to terminate the franchise con
tract for any violation, no matter how small.

This provi

sion does not give the franchisee the opportunity to correct
the problem, or explain the circumstances if the situation
was something he had no control over.

The provision could

become quite a tool if there is some strong resentment
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between the franchisor and franchisee.
Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that national franchises may be
over-controlling their system by using large numbers of
provisions in their contracts when compared to the number of
provisions found in the regional franchises.

The difference

between the well-known versus the less-known is sixty-four
provisions in favor of the well-known franchises.

The

average mean number of provisions found in the national and
regional franchises was 73 and 68 respectively.

The median

for national franchises is 74, and 70 for regional
franchises.
Because the difference is numerically small in size,
the data shown below does not prove that the hypothesis is
correct, nor is there conclusive evidence that the theory is
wrong.
theory.

Further study is needed to prove or disprove the
In addition, the data in Figure 2 also gives the

reader the number of provisions each franchise contract
possessed and the percentage of provisions found in relation
to the 158 provisions used in the research.
In addition to comparing the original study for
reoccurrence of questionable provisions, the current study
was also designed to identify provisions not mentioned in
the original study.

A new provision was discovered and was

titled in the contracts as AREA DEVELOPER.

The franchised

area developer is generally someone who builds the buildings
used to house a franchised restaurant.

The area developer
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does not own the land or buildings, but contracts with a
franchisor to build several establishments within a speci
fied area.
constraint.

Usually the area developer is under a time
The contracts for the developer do not differ a

great deal from the food franchise except it is geared
towards construction terminology.
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
—

1973

1988

1.

FRANCHISE FEE

.75

.100

2.

NON-REFUNDABLE FEES

.00

.54

3.

ROYALTY

.75

.88

4.

NATIONAL ADVERTISING

.34

.88

5.

LOCAL ADVERTISING

.53

.62

6.

RENEWAL FEE

.09

.30

7.

SERVICE FEE

.16

.27

8.

RENTAL/LEASE PAYMENTS

.25

.31

9.

RENT ADJUSTMENT

.01

.04

10.

PURCHASE PAYMENTS

.75

.08

11.

INDIRECT PAYMENTS

.03

.00

12.

SPECIAL PAYMENTS

.27

.58

13.

PENALTIES

.22

.65

14.

SECURITY DEPOSITS

.12

.00

15.

TERMINATION PENALTIES

.00

.04

16.

LENGTH OF CONTRACT TERMS

.77

.88

17.

OPTION TO RENEW

.52

.69

18.

EXCLUSIVE TERRITORY

.65

.63

19.

START UP DATE

.11

.46

20.

FRANCHISOR CONFIDENTIAL
DISCLOSURE

.07

.08

21.

FRANCHISEE CONFIDENTIAL
DISCLOSURE

.55

.58

22.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

.56

.81
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973

1988

23.

HOLD HARMLESS

.61

.69

24.

ACT OF GOD

.14

.15

25.

NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT

.61

.73

26.

ILLEGAL COVENANT

.55

.69

27.

LEGAL BUSINESS

.14

.08

28.

FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATION
FORBIDDEN

.02

.00

29.

RIGHT TO FUTURE REVISION

.49

.77

30.

OPERATING MANUAL

.40

.81

31.

GOODWILL PAYMENTS

.06

.04

32.

CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCY

.25

.58

33.

COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL LAWS

.52

.58

34.

FRANCHISE DISABILITY

.57

.50

35.

ARBITRATION

.21

.46

36.

SITE SELECTION

.09

.62

37.

INCORPORATION PERMITTED

.93

.88

38.

TRADEMARK RESTRICTION

.53

.96

39.

DISTINCTIVE ARCHITECTURE

.28

.62

40.

GOOD ETHICS

.04

.46

41.

STATE OF INTERPRETATION

.97

.73

42.

VENUE CLAUSE

.27

.15

43.

SUB-FRANCHISING

.64

.04

44.

CIVIL RIGHTS

.01

.00

45.

FULL TIME

.15

.35
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973

1988

46.

COMPETITIVE BUSINESS

.34

.81

47.

RESTRICTION ON SALE OF GOODS

.02

.00

48.

PRODUCT SERVICE

.00

.04

49.

SALES QUOTA

.00

.00

50.

GUARANTEED SALES

.00

.00

51.

PHYSICAL LAYOUT APPROVAL

.33

.69

52.

LOCAL VARIATIONS PERMITTED

.11

.12

53 .

DAYS OPEN

.53

.50

54.

HOURS OPEN

.52

.54

55.

PRODUCT LINE

.70

.77

56.

PRICE CONTROL

.27

.08

57.

ALTERNATION APPROVAL

.65

.62

58.

FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP

.29

.12

59.

FRANCHISOR OWNERSHIP

.27

.19

60.

FRANCHISEE LEASES

.22

.81

61.

FRANCHISOR LEASES

.34

.19

62.

LEASE APPROVAL

.14

.23

63.

NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE

.02

.31

64.

LEASE BACK

.02

.27

65.

LEASE LOSS

.14

.42

66.

ANALYZE REPORTS

.29

.31

67.

ADVERTISING

.20

.69

68 «

ACCOUNT FOR ADVERTISING FUNDS

.08

.31
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973

1988

69 .

ADVISE AND CONSULT

.12

.58

70.

INSPECT

.12

.92

71.

ADVISE FRANCHISEE OF CHANGES

.34

.65

72.

GRAND OPENING ASSISTANCE

.24

.65

73.

BANK APPROVAL

.05

.04

74 .

BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM APPROVAL

.22

.27

75.

BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM REQUIRED

.49

.62

76.

ANNUAL CERTIFIED AUDIT

.28

.46

77.

RIGHT TO AUDIT BOOKS

.48

.92

78.

MARGIN OF ERROR

.29

.69

79.

INCOME TAX COPY

.16

.31

80.

PERIODIC REPORTS

.68

.88

81.

CASH WITHDRAWAL

.00

.00

82.

PROFIT WITHDRAWAL

.09

.00

83.

EMPLOYEE UNIFORMS

.41

.42

84.

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT

.40

.27

85.

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

.08

.04

86.

RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE

.06

.04

87.

FRANCHISEE FORMAL TRAINING

.01

.85

88.

FRANCHISEE REFRESHER COURSE

.12

.42

89.

SUBSEQUENT MANAGER TRAINING

.19

.69

90.

KEY EMPLOYEE TRAINING

.19

.39

91.

ALL EMPLOYEE TRAINING

.98

.08
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973

1.9 8.8

92.

OJT AND ASSISTANCE

.21

.27

93.

FRANCHISOR ADMINISTRATION

.15

.27

94.

FRANCHISOR CO-INSURED

.50

.85

95.

CANCELLATION NOTICE

.15

.73

96.

APPROVAL OF COMPANY

.18

.46

97.

PROOF OF INSURANCE

.38

.88

98.

BUSINESS INTERRUPTION

.01

.19

99.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

.41

.69

100.

PERSONAL

.07

.46

101.

EMPLOYER LIABILITY

.18

.81

102.

PROPERTY LIABILITY

.67

.92

103.

PRODUCT LIABILITY

.77

.81

104.

PAPER GOODS-MAY BUY

.47

.19

105.

PAPER GOODS-MUST BUY

.00

.00

106.

PAPER GOODS-VENDOR APPROVAL

.51

.39

107.

PAPER GOODS-STANDARDS

.40

.81

108.

OPERATING SUPPLIES - MAY BUY

.48

.12

109.

OPERATING SUPPLIES - MUST BUY

.00

.23

.52

.39

110.

OPERATING SUPPLIES - VENDOR
APPROVAL

111.

OPERATING SUPPLIES - STANDARDS

.49

.69

112.

EQUIPMENT-MAY BUY

.63

.27

113.

EQUIPMENT-MUST BUY

.00

.08

114.

EQUIPMENT-STANDARDS

.34

.65
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973

1988

115. SIGNS-MAY/MUST BUY

.49

.12

116. SIGNS-VENDOR APPROVAL

.19

.23

117. SIGNS-STANDARDS

.28

.65

118. PRICE RESTRICTIONS

.04

.00

119. FRANCHISOR-VENDOR REBATE

.02

.12

120. VENDING APPROVAL

.16

.46

121. FRANCHISOR/FRANCHISEE
ADVERTISING

.26

.39

122. RIGHT TO ENTER AND DESTROY

.12

.50

123. SIGNS REQUIRED

.54

.65

124. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL

.65

.62

125. ADVERTISING COMMITTEE

.07

.39

126. FRANCHISOR RIGHT OF FIRST
APPROVAL

.35

.85

127. FRANCHISEE RIGHT OF FIRST
APPROVAL

.04

.00

128. RIGHT OF INHERITANCE

.32

.50

129. LIMITED RIGHT OF INHERITANCE

.00

.31

130. NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE

.00

.00

131. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL OF SALE

.74

.77

132. NO FOR-SALE ADVERTISING

.00

.04

133. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS

.04

.50

134. STOCK TRANSFER APPROVAL

.06

.77

135. NO GOODWILL PAYMENTS

.00

.54

136. FAILURE TO PAY

.21

.77
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)
(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973

1988

137. FRANCHISEE EARLY TERMINATION

.24

.35

138. FRANCHISOR EARLY TERMINATION

.99

.12

139. TERMINATION FOR ANY VIOLATION

.00

.35

140. TERMINATION FOR
VIOLATION/STANDARDS

.05

.73

141. TERMINATION FOR BANKRUPTCY

.30

.85

142. TERMINATION FOR TRAINING
FAILURE

.02

.15

143. IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION

.42

.27

144. GRACE PERIOD

.66

.04

145. 10-DAY

.00

.39

146. 30-DAY

.00

.58

147. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE-YEARS

.62

.73

148. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE-MILES

.52

.69

149. COVENANT NOT TO HIRE

.26

.15

150. COVENANT NOT TO USE SYSTEM

.50

.46

151. COVENANT TO CEASE OPERATIONS

.53

.92

152. COVENANT TO CHANGE BUILDING

.20

.58

153. COVENANT TO REMOVE SIGNS

.26

.65

154. COST OF ENFORCEMENT

.22

.50

155. EQUIPMENT

.32

.46

156. SIGNS

.30

.46

157. TRADEMARK SUPPLIES

.27

.46

158. REGULAR SUPPLIES

.14

.46
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Note;

the comparison is made by taking each individual
provision and numerically identifying how many times
it appears in the collect year group of contracts.
The 1973 percentages were from one hundred twenty-two
fast food contracts and the 1988 were from twenty-six
fast food contracts.
FIGURE 2

NATIONAL

REGIONAL

Total # of
provisions
per contract

% in each
contract

Total # of
provisions
per contract

58

.37

24

.15

63

.40

46

.29

67

.42

61

.39

67

.42

67

.42

72

.45

69

.43

73

.46

70

.44

74

.47

70

.44

77

.49

73

.46

77

.49

74

.47

80

.51

75

.48

80

.51

81

.53

80

.51

86

.54

82

.52

90

.57

886

total 950
Note:

% in each
contract

The symbol # means the number of provisions in each
contract. The symbol % means the percentage of
provisions found in each contract in relation to the
158 provisions used in the research.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY
This research does not offer factual evidence to refute
or support any allegations.

The function of this research

is to provide the reader a basis of evaluating, and under
standing franchise agreements.

Opinions and/or suggestions

made by the author are not intended to sway the reader for,
or against, the franchisor, or franchised businesses.

The

author's intent is to identify the reoccurrence of ques
tionable provisions identified in the original study in
anticipation of giving the reader information about provi
sions that may be detrimental in operating a franchised
business.
In conclusion, there is still considerable control
applied to franchisees through contractual provisions.
Several provisions such as the lease-back clause, wherein
the franchisee loses all equity if he should lose his lease
on the land, remains questionable.
In this study, the majority of the provisions have the
possibility of being unfair if enforced as written.

In this

study 15 percent of the 158 provisions were identified as
being unfair according to the value judgement of Dr. Udell's
previous research and provides the franchisor with a power
ful tool to control an independent business person.
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Not all

of the provisions prove to be unfair.

There are some that

should be present to insure standards and services are
applied uniformly throughout the established franchise
system.
What may be more alarming and still present is the ever
elusive owner's manual.

In each contract reviewed, there is

some statement binding the franchisee to comply with the
owner's manual.

Unfortunately, the prospective franchisee

will not be allowed to look inside this manual until he has
signed the contract.

When the manual has been reviewed, the

franchisee may feel that he has been misled, and is now
unable to withdraw from the contractual agreement without
being assessed a substantial penalty.
In all of the reviewed contracts, the franchisor had
the right to "revise" the manual.

These revisions were to

be "within reason", but not once was "within reason" speci
fied in numerical terms.

Yet the franchisee will have to

abide by the manual as specified in the contract.
It is recommended that the franchisor provide a more
in-depth narrative in what the owner's manual requires from
the franchisee.
The reader should note that the terms "unfair" and
"fair" are derivatives from Dr. Udell's previous study and
are value judgments used in this follow-up research.

What

may be an unfair provision to the author may not be unfair
to the reader.
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Therefore, the reader should apply his own judgmental
values to the material he has read and decide what would be
fair or unfair in the provisions that were presented.
Finally, the writer tried to prove a hypothesis that
nationally known franchisors apply more control than the
regionally established franchises.

There were exactly

thirteen national and thirteen regional franchises.

The

cumulative total of provisions from the national franchises
numbered 950.

The regional franchises' cumulative total

numbered 886.

While these figures indicate that the

national franchisors possessed sixty-four more provisions
than the regional franchisors, it should be noted that
several of the regional franchises provided little guidance
except a reference to the owner's manual.

What was found

was that smaller franchises used smaller print and more
legal words which many people would find hard to understand.
The data gathered from this research provided incon
clusive evidence in proving or disproving the hypothesis.
This would be an excellent area to look into for a follow-up
research.
Although we have seen many questionable provisions
during the review of the contract agreements, the recent
data gathered from business literature, newspapers, and
television news indicate that franchising is on the rise.
This suggests that those unfair clauses are not being
enforced or the franchisee considers the profit worth the
hassle.

Either way, franchising is booming and to answer
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the question "why" requires further study into what exactly
has changed the industry into a lucrative business.
The information in this follow-up research has indi
cated that the provisions identified in the original study
are still prevalent in contracts used in present day agree
ments between franchisors and franchisees.

Wherein the

provisions are still questionable in fairness, the informa
tion presented in the USA TODAY. 11 February 1988 edition,
indicates franchising is on the rise.

Despite the presence

of questionable provisions identified in this follow-up
research, if the reader has some desire to enter the fran
chise market, he should conduct an in-depth investigation as
to what is expected from him as a franchisor and precise
duties of the franchisor before entering an agreement.
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APPENDIX I
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS
The 158 franchise provisions used in reviewing the
contractual agreements are grouped according to standard
sections of a standard contract.
PAYMENTS TO THE FRANCHISOR
1.

FRANCHISE FEE - Payment for the privilege of doing

business using the trademarks of the franchisor is typically
covered by a franchise fee.
$9,000 to $85,000.

Franchise fees ranged from

There were two fees that were left open

for negotiation.
In some contracts, portions of the franchise fee were
used to defray the cost the franchisor incurred for helping
in site location, franchisee formal training, opening day
supervision, and construction of facilities.

For the most

part, what the franchisor receives in the franchise fee is
profit, even though a few stated in their contracts that
this fee defrayed the expense of getting the franchisee
started, therefore, no monetary gain is recognized.

There

is no argument that the franchisor is entitled to the fran
chise fee to do as he wishes.
But to create a more perfect union between the two, and
reduce the suspicion the franchisee has of being overcharged

40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for inferior service, the franchisor should specify what the
fee is for and what areas of service the fee covers.
2.

NON-REFUNDABLE FEES - This clause, for the most part,

pertains to the franchise fee paid to the franchisor.

There

were some contracts that would allow the return of portions
of fees paid should an individual terminate the agreement
either prior to actually operating the business or early in
the operation of the business.
There are some instances where the franchise fee was
large and the franchisee would pay an initial portion upon
signing the contract.

The remaining balance would be paid

at some specified period during the life of the contract.
Should there be an early termination, or termination
occurred prior to the operation of the business, it would be
the initial payment that would not be refundable.

There

were five controls that stated that under no circumstances
would any portion of fees paid be refunded once the contract
had been signed.

Those contracts that stipulate no refund,

should be modified to allow refund of monies when termina
tion occurs under circumstance beyond the franchisee's
control.
In all fairness to the franchisor, there should be a
deduction from the refund for actual expenses incurred
during the operation of the franchise up to termination.
3.

ROYALTY - This payment is derived from the franchisee's

gross receipts from sales, and it is considered a payment
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for services the franchisor provides during the life of the
contract.

The franchisee is usually required to report

gross sales to the franchisor.

This report gives the fran

chisor the tool to evaluate whether the franchisee has paid
the correct amount of royalty payment.
In this research, the fee ranged between 2 and 8 per
cent of gross sales.

The payment is normally made on a

monthly basis and is compounded with additional charges if
the franchisee is late in making the payment to the
franchisor.
Wherein this payment is designed to pay the franchisor
for services rendered, there were no provisions in any of
the contracts reviewed specifying stoppage of payments
should there be a conflict in what the franchisor is to
provide and what the franchisee is to receive in services.
This could be a questionable practice if not modified to
allow some protection for the franchisee if the franchisor
does not provide the service specified in the contract.
Otherwise, the franchisee has to continue to pay for what he
is not getting.

A viable solution would be the establish

ment of an escrow account, wherein the franchisee would
deposit the royalty payment if a dispute were to occur and
neither party would have access to it until the dispute is
settled.
4-5.

NATIONAL AND LOCAL ADVERTISING PAYMENT - Many fran

chisors take the responsibility in advertising and promoting
the franchised business.

In doing this, the franchisor
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requires participation of all franchisees in an advertising
program.
The program is not voluntary in most cases and does
include advertising both nationally and locally.

Fran

chisees are required to pay specified sums based upon gross
sales to the franchisor to cover the expense of promoting
the franchise name.

It should be understood that in this

study, all franchisees within the franchised business con
tribute to this fund.
From the franchisor's perspective, this type of program
provides a uniform presentation of the franchised business
to the public.

When traveling, you may see advertising

boards by the side of the road displaying the location of
your favorite hamburger establishment to be approximately
two miles down the road.

Being hungry and knowing the

quality of food is good because this establishment is in
your home town, you will probably stop there in lieu of the
"mom and pop" cafe you just passed.

Because of the national

and regional advertising, we become familiar with the
establishment and come to expect the same good quality
service no matter where we are.
This is what standardization in advertising can do for
a franchise business.

Perhaps at this time many readers

would be wondering just how the franchisor accounts for the
advertising expenditures?

Several franchisors provide

detailed reports as to what was spent and how.

This report

format is similar to an accounting balance sheet and is
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either provided to the franchisee or readily available upon
request.
fund.

There are some franchisors that have a matching

This matching fund is essentially a one for one

dollar deposit by the franchisor for each deposit made by
the franchisee.

Every franchisee is supposed to pay his

equal and fair share.

There are, however, some franchisors

who do not feel it is anyone's business to know where the
money collected from the franchisee is going or how it is
spent.

This kind of behavior has the potential of opening

the doors of mistrust between the two parties because the
franchisee may feel he has the right to know what he is
spending his money for.
6.

RENEWAL FEE - This payment is made by the franchisee to

the franchisor for the renewal of the franchised business at
the end of a specified period.

The payments were sometimes

a percentage of the original franchise fee or a set amount
for each renewal period.

Under certain circumstances where

more than one franchise establishment was owned by a
franchisee, franchisee would only have to pay a renewal fee
for one franchise business and something of a token payment
for the second and additional franchise business.

The

renewal period ranged between ten additional years to
infinity.
7.

SERVICE FEES - Service fees were generally payments for

some service the franchisor provided to the franchisee.
This particular provision appeared in seven contracts.
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Perhaps the reason for the limited occurrence could be
linked directly to the large franchise fees paid at the
initial contractual agreement.
It was noted that three franchisors did state in their
contracts that formal and OJT training were included in the
franchise fee.

These and many other types of services

provided by the franchisor seem to be distributed throughout
the 158 provisions making it impossible to focus the pay
ments into Service Fees.
8.

RENT OR LEASE PAYMENTS - The franchisee is given the

option to rent or lease property, equipment, or signs from
the franchisor within the terms of the lease or rent speci
fied in the contract.
In this study, there was no provision requiring the
franchisee to lease or rent from the franchisor.
Renting or leasing from the franchisor could increase
the control the franchisor has over the franchisee.

For

example, a franchisee rents his equipment from the fran
chisor.

The franchisee is required to upgrade or change the

equipment upon notice from the franchisor.
If the franchisee is responsible for the expense of
this change and there is not a written agreement as to how
many times the upgrades or changes will occur in a specific
time period, the franchisee could be liable for several
changes within a year.

The cost of these changes could be a

financial burden to the franchisee.
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This situation can be controlled by having a very
descriptive clause in the initial agreement as to how often
equipment changes or upgrades can be made by the franchisor
in a specific time frame.
9.

RENT/LEASE ADJUSTMENT - If the franchisee rents from

the franchisor he/she could be susceptible to an increase in
rent or lease payments.

The term rent adjustment is self

explanatory and may be considered fair or unfair depending
on how it is administered in each individual contract.

The

franchisor has the right to adjust the payment, but the
question of fairness rests in why there is an increase and
how much.
The franchisor could provide an explanation and details
to the franchisee in justifying the increase in payments.
This sort of cooperation could create mutual respect and
understanding from both parties since both are business
persons in a common line of work.
10.

PURCHASE PAYMENT - Under this provision, the franchisee

may be required or given the option to purchase inventory,
operating supplies, and/or equipment from the franchisor.
With one exception, there were no cases of franchisees being
required to purchase from the franchisor.

The one exception

involved required purchase of ingredients that were trade
secret to each respective franchised business.

This excep

tion can be related to maintaining the competitive edge and
trade secrets.
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In a financial light, the cost of the initial start-up
could be quite large, therefore, some franchisors allowed
installment pay periods for the initial purchase of equip
ment , inventory, or supplies.
Others included the initial purchase cost in the
estimate of initial capital necessary to begin the business.
On an interval type basis or as purchase becomes neces
sary , the franchisee would have to pay for equipment,
inventories, or supplies received from the franchisor
according to the agreed terms which usually specified when
the payment would have to be received.
Usually late payments incurred some percentage of
interest for each day after the due date.
11.

INDIRECT PAYMENTS - This payment sometimes involves a

third party.

The franchisee makes payments to the fran

chisor who, in turn, makes payments to a supplier.

The

problem occurs when the franchisee has to pay extra amounts
to reimburse the expense or gratuities the franchisor incurs
when doing business with the supplier (third party).

The

franchisee may perceive he is being overcharged by the
franchisor.
This practice is questionable in that the franchisor is
the one who conducted the business between himself and the
supplier and not the franchisee.

It should be the

franchisor who is responsible for expenses incurred in this
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exchange.

Research findings indicate there was no visible

evidence that this was a common practice.
12.

SPECIAL PAYMENTS - These payments are one time payments

for specific services provided by the franchisor, such as
grand opening or a specific promotion.

Of the 26 agree

ments, 15 provided provisions for these types of services.
If the franchisee pays for services mentioned above and the
franchisor fails to complete the service, the franchisor
could refund all monies with no penalties.

What the

franchisees fear is possible termination should they demand
the refund for non-performance by the franchisor.
If there is a question of non-performance, a system
whereby payment is withheld and deposited into a neutral
account should be established.
has been paid.

With this system, the money

Therefore, the franchisee is not liable for

nonpayment charges and the money will not be received by the
franchisor until the service is done or the dispute
resolved.
13.

PENALTIES - This particular provision was levied

against the franchisee for various reasons ranging from late
payment to erroneous bookkeeping.
are self-explanatory.

Late payment penalties

The franchisee is liable for unan

nounced periodic inspection of the financial books.

If the

franchisee's actual gross income differs from the gross
income reported to the home office, a penalty is assessed in
the form of a requirement to pay all that is due to the

48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

franchisor, plus a percentage of interest on the amount that
was not reported.

Sometimes the percentage was based on the

number of days the additional amount of gross income had not
been reported.

The assessment of penalties becomes ques

tionable in the dollar amount required in fair value to the
business and the standard assessment of these penalties
under mitigating circumstances beyond the franchisee's
control.
14.

SECURITY DEPOSITS - This deposit deals with the initial

start-up of the business.

The security deposit was designed

to induce faithful performance by the franchisee.
The franchisee makes the initial deposit of the fran
chise fee with installments thereafter.

Should there be

some breach of contract, the franchisee essentially loses
all monies in the account.

At best, this provides the

franchisor with security, but what of the franchisee?
In most cases little to nothing is mentioned in the
event the franchisor defaults in some aspect of the con
tract.

This leaves a dispute as to what is owed to the

franchisor.
The franchisor claims the deposit is rightfully his for
doing business under the franchised trademarks.

The fran

chisee claims he is making payments for services not
received.

In addition to losing the deposit, there is the

possibility the franchisee will have to pay a penalty for
early termination.
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15.

TERMINATION PENALTIES - This penalty is assessed should

the franchisee terminate the agreement early or some viola
tion by the franchisee

causes

early termination. The

termination is no more

than a liquidating charge that, in

some cases, is not assessed according to the fair market
value of the going concern.
It could be used as an ax over the franchisee's head.
Many times early termination is unforeseen and far beyond
the control of the franchisee.

Yet, without regard to this

fact, a penalty could be used by the franchisor to gain a
slight profit.

Fortunately, only one contract contained

this provision.
GENERAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS
16.

LENGTH OF CONTRACT TERMS - The majority of the con

tracts provided the length of
enforced.

The average

the time the terms would be

time ranged between 15 to 20 years

with options to renew the contract for additional years.
There were, however, three contracts that did not specify
definite time periods or allowed the time span to vary
according to negotiation.

The only concern that warrants

close evaluation deals with long-term leases and short
contract periods, especially when the franchisee leases from
the franchisor.

In this particular situation the franchisee

could be forced to give up his business because he is not
given the option to renew the contract on a profitable
business.

This situation can take another shape where the
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lease is short and the contract period is long.

In this

situation the franchisee could lose the business because the
franchisor will not renew the lease.
17.

OPTION TO RENEW - At the end of the contract period,

the franchisee may be given the option to renew the agree
ment for a specified additional number of years.

The

renewal may be under the old terms or, in most cases, the
renewal will be made under terms that are used for current
contractual agreements.
18.

EXCLUSIVE TERRITORY - This provision is probably the

most mutually beneficial for both franchisee and franchisor.
Exclusive territory provides a specified area where a par
ticular franchised business can operate without having to
compete with a going concern from the same franchise in the
same geographical area.

The specified area is usually

designated in writing at the initial review and signing of
the contract.

Under normal circumstances, the franchisor

cannot breach this provision without prior permission of the
franchisee whose area is affected.

While this provision

favors the franchisee, the franchisee should understand that
this area is fixed and cannot be extended without prior
permission from the franchisor.
19.

START-UP DATE - Franchisors frequently require the

business to be operational by a specific date.

In some

cases, if the franchisee has not opened by the specified
date, immediate termination and forfeiture of partial or all
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fees paid could occur.

Franchisors can be strict in apply

ing this provision, but allow for delays if the delay is
requested within a reasonable time prior to the projected
opening day.
There are some who can visualize a franchisor orches
trating deliberate delays just to cause termination whereby
keeping the money paid by the franchisee and possibly con
structed facilities.
20.

FRANCHISOR CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE - This clause holds

the franchisor to a promise that he/she will not disclose
information pertaining to the franchisee's personal finan
cial position or business operations except when necessary
in the conduct of business.

This clause is seldom seen.

Only two contracts contained this provision.
21.

FRANCHISEE CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE - There is not much

difference with this provision and

#20

with the exception it

is applied to the franchisee and is most common in the
contractual agreement.

To breach this clause more likely

will bring about a law suit and possible fines levied as a
penalty.

The clause involves a lot of do's and don'ts the

franchisee must adhere to.

Franchisors do not have as many

rules to abide by.
22.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR - The franchisor separates

himself from the franchisee with the provision.

The provi

sion identifies the franchisee as his own agent and attempts
to ensure the franchisor is not held responsible for the
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action of the franchisee.

There is a question of validity

in the franchisor's disclaimer.

The franchisor cannot

disclaim actions that were directives from the franchisor.
23.

HOLD HARMLESS - The hold harmless clause is the same as

the independent contractor, except this clause is considered
to have a clearer definition of non-responsibility on behalf
of the franchisor.
Throughout the research, the majority of the contracts
had provisions to cover the entire spectrum of who is re
sponsible for actions that may cause damage.
24.

ACT OF GOD - In the event some agreed upon action could

not be accomplished because there was an event beyond the
control of the franchisor or franchisee that prevented the
completion of the action, it was generally considered as an
act of God.

There was very limited application of the

provision among the twenty-six contracts reviewed.

Four

contracts had this provision.
25.

NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT - In some cases, a franchisor may

not penalize a franchisee for some defaults of the contrac
tual agreement.

The no waiver of default provision,

however, stipulates that if the franchisor did not penalize
the franchisee for a previous default, the action does not
negate a penalty for the same default in the future.
key issue is the "sometimes factor".

Sometimes it is

enforced and sometimes not.
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The

The classic application occurs when there has been
several defaults by the franchisee and the franchisor does
nothing.

Then one day, the franchisor decides to enforce

the provision against the previously overlooked defaults,
which usually results in heavy penalties or termination.

In

the previous study conducted by Dr. Udell, he suggested
registered mail be used to notify the defaulting franchisee.
Therefore, receipt could be documented and recorded.

Along

with this suggestion, it is imperative that franchisors
become consistent in the application of this provision if
they are not trying to send a signal that says defaults are
tolerated.
26.

ILLEGAL COVENANT - Typically, the franchised business

is not always located in the same state as the home office.
By virtue of independence, each state has its own laws to
govern business practices.

Many contracts have standard

agreements that, at times, may be invalid within the state
the franchised business is operating.

If there is a dispute

and some part of the agreement is found to be illegal within
the specific state, the entire agreement could possibly be
considered invalid.
To preclude nullification of the entire contract, the
illegal covenant provision states that if any part of the
agreement is found to be in violation of some law, the
remaining portions of the contract shall remain valid and
will be enforced.
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27.

LEGAL BUSINESS - This provision stipulates that the

franchised business will engage in lawful business only.
The research found only two contracts that included this
clause.

It is believed the small occurrence of the provi

sion may be linked to vague statements made in the Indepen
dent Contractor and/or Hold Harmless clauses.

Within these

two clauses, many statements could be interpreted as a legal
business provision.

It would behoove the franchisor to be

more clear in this provision.
28.

FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATION FORBIDDEN - Fortunately, within

the scope of this research, no franchisors forbid group
association of company franchisees or with franchisees
outside the company.

In fact, many encouraged group

association through annual franchisee conventions and group
advertising.
29.

RIGHT TO FUTURE REVISION - This provision gives the

franchisor the unlimited right to make changes in the way
the franchisee operates the business.

Normally the changes

apply to all the stores in the franchised operation.

The

majority of the contracts reviewed specified that the
changes would be within reason.
reason" needs to be clarified.

What constitutes "within
Changes in operation some

times mean the acquisition of new equipment.

While it is

understandable that modernization is necessary, what is
financially timely for the franchisor may not be timely for
the franchisee.

For the more distrustful, the unlimited
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right to make changes presents the picture of total control
by the franchisor.

If contested in court, both parties may

find it difficult to define "changes within reason".

A more

in-depth clause that provides specific limits on how many
times changes can be made within the life of the contract
could be a viable solution.

The clause might also provide

limits on money the franchisee has to spend on each charge.
By doing this, mistrust and ill will can be reduced and a
more mutually beneficial relationship established.
30.

OPERATION MANUAL - Twenty-one of the twenty-six con

tracts had provisions for the operations manual.

The manual

itself"Is the bible for operating a franchised business.
Yet it is the most obscure provision in all the contracts
reviewed.

In each contract, the franchisee was required to

operate within the guidelines of the manual that was pro
vided.

In each franchised business, the manual and its con

tents are secret and will be revealed only to the franchise
manager and pertinent managing staff.

Revelation of the

manual occurs only after the franchisee has signed the
agreement.

Once the agreement has been signed, the fran

chisee is liable for any and all requirements within the
operation manual.

This situation is equivalent to being

blind and walking in the middle of the street in downtown
New York City.

The impression one gets is that many demand

ing issues can be hidden within the confines of the manual.
Failure to follow the manual provisions can result in penal
ties or immediate termination.
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This point was made quite clear in each of the twentyone contracts.

There is possible danger in agreeing to

something you have not seen!

In the initial study conducted

some ten years ago, it was thought that the passing of the
Wisconsin Senate Bill 784, which would likely require dis
closure of franchise agreements, would negate the secretive
nature of the manual.

The present research found the secre

tive manual is still alive and prevalent among franchisors.
31.

GOODWILL PAYMENTS - The most descriptive phrase for

this provision is "almost nonexistent".

During the opera

tion of the franchised business, the franchisee, if success
ful, may acquire an intangible asset known as goodwill.
Research revealed only one franchisor that made pay
ments for goodwill.

In justifying non-payment of goodwill,

the franchisor is claiming that the franchisee is not
entitled to said payments because the trademarks are owned
by the franchisor.

The question that may be asked by the

franchisee is, "what good is the franchise and the trademark
without the quality service of the franchisee?"
32.

CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCY - At some point in time during

the life of the contract, the franchisee may have a "less
than desirable" operation of the franchised business accor
ding to the provisions of the franchisor.

Typically, a

provision allows a grace period in which the problem should
be corrected.

Normally the deficiency is discovered by a

visiting representative of the franchise home office.

57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A

written or verbal notice is given and from the time the
notice is given, the franchisee has a specified period of
time to correct the problem.

If the problem has not been

corrected at the end of the grace period, penalties or
termination could be assessed.
provision appeared.

In all 15 contracts, this

The franchisor had the option to send a

home office representative to the troubled business if the
deficiency has not been corrected at the end of the grace
period.

The representative's salary, room and board is

charged to the franchisee.

The problem with this provision

is proper notification of a deficiency and the time allowed
for correction.

Some problems may take more than 3 or 5

days to correct due to the nature of the problem.
Most contracts were strict in citing the precise number of
days to make the correction.

Before the franchisee has to

pay for the forced help sent by the franchisor and possible
additional penalties, both parties should discuss the reali
ties as to how long it takes to fix the problem.
33.

COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL LAWS - Under most contractual

agreements, the franchisee is held responsible for all
provisions.

Franchised companies were designed to branch

out in different locales.

This expansion of units puts each

franchised business in different townships, cities and
states.

This provision relieves any conflicts between

contractual requirements and local laws.

The local laws

take precedence.
58

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34.

FRANCHISEE DISABILITY - Should a franchisee become

seriously ill or die, this clause states that the franchisor
will operate the business on behalf of the franchisee until
a suitable replacement is found.

Monies or profits earned

during the period the franchisor runs the business is
usually placed in a separate account except the amounts the
franchisor needs to actually run the business.

Potential

disagreement exists in the franchisor's determination of who
is suitable for replacing the disabled franchisee.

The

majority of contracts with this provision grant the sole
right to the franchisor to choose who is suitable to run the
business.

This means the candidate has to meet an unspeci

fied number of requirements known only by the franchisor.
35.

ARBITRATION - Some contracts allow arbitration should

there be some conflict between the franchisor and fran
chisee.

Most adhere to rules of the American Arbitration

Association.

All decisions of the arbitrator are final.

In

Dr. Udell's previous study, this provision was strongly
recommended.
36.

SITE SELECTION - Franchisees are required to receive

prior approval from the franchisor before making the final
selection in the site of the franchised business.

Many

contract provisions give the franchisor the option of
helping franchisee select the site, but specifically make it
clear that the franchisor is not obligated in providing this
service.

Contracts that specify start up dates, usually do
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not start their counting of days toward mandatory opening
until final site selection has been made.

Implementation of

this clause can take place prior to the actual signing of
the contract wherein signing of the contract is delayed
until final approval of the site is made.

The second method

of implementation occurs after signing the contract and the
franchisee is given an average of 90 days to find and get
final approval for a selected site.

The second method

presents a slight problem in that if a site has not been
approved within the 90 days, there is a possibility the
entire contract could be nullified and void unless specific
conditions are made.

MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS
37.

INCORPORATION PERMITTED - The franchisee is allowed, if

not"encouraged to incorporate the business as long as con
trolling interest rests with the franchisee.

A list of all

share owners is normally required to be submitted to the
franchisor to include how many shares each shareholder owns.
Each shareholder is held responsible for adherence to the
contract covenants.

Shareholders are required to receive

prior consent from the franchisor before selling their
shares.
38.

TRADEMARK RESTRICTIONS - Trademarks belong to the

franchisor and are leased/loaned to the franchisee through
the life of the contract.

This provision clarifies that the
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franchisee is licensed to use the trademark only for the
operation of the franchised business.

The trademarks cannot

be used after termination or for business outside of the
realm of the franchise operation without prior consent of
the franchisor.

The provision reaffirms the franchisor

ownership of all trademarks, trade secrets, and service
marks.

It also stipulates that the franchisee cannot con

test ownership at any time.
39.

DISTINCTIVE ARCHITECTURE - To make each franchised

business unique and distinctive, franchisors require the
outside of the building of occupation and inside decor meet
layouts and color schemes specified by the franchisor.

Most

franchisors require prior approval if a franchisee wants to
deviate from set layouts or color schemes.

The provision

also clarifies franchisor ownership to the layouts and color
scheme, so at termination, the franchisee will not be able
to copy or use the designs and plans.
40.

GOOD ETHICS - This provision requires ethical operation

of the business on behalf of the franchisee to the consumer.
It has been questioned whether this provision can be
enforced.

Many feel franchisors cannot enforce this pro

vision and it should not be entered into the actual agree
ment if enforceability cannot be done.

Most franchisees

want a successful business and most likely will practice
high ethical standards.

The franchisor should demonstrate

ethical behavior when dealing with the franchisee, thus per
petuating ethical standards within the franchised business.
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41.

STATE OF INTERPRETATION - This clause specifies the

state in which the contract will be interpreted.

The state

of interpretation is usually the state in which the fran
chisor's home office is based.
41,

VENUE CLAUSE - This provision is sometimes indistin

guishable from the preceding provision.

The provision

identifies the specific state, and at times, cities in which
all legal matters or disputes will be heard or settled.
There are some contracts that will make a neutral location
or the nearest arbitrator the place to settle problems.
What is unfair in this and the previous provision is when
the franchisee has to travel to the home state of the fran
chisor.

The cost for travel is out-of-pocket money for the

franchisee, who is not reimbursed.

The neutral location is

the best choice because each will bear the cost of some type
of travel.
43.

SUB-FRANCHISING - Within this study, sub-franchising of

the fast food business was almost non-existent.

What was

noticed was a new type of franchising of buildings and land
to be used for fast food franchising.

If the franchisor did

not want direct dealings in passing out franchise portions,
he would franchise with one person and give him the
authority to portion out the franchise business.
is called an area franchisee.

The dealer

This type of splitting

creates a middleman with whom the franchisee has to do
business along
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with the franchisor.

Communication between all three

parties be hampered and there is some risk in the competency
of the middleman.
44.

CIVIL RIGHTS - Most contracts never address this provi

sion because of the interpretation.

Generally most fran

chisors get around this by requiring franchisees obey all
State, Federal and local laws.
45.

FULL TIME - Franchisors require full time participation

or best effort from the franchisee in the operation of the
franchise business.

It is understandable the franchisor

wants successful operation of the franchise business, but
"full time" participation may be somewhat unreasonable.
Besides, what are assistant managers for?
the "best effort".

More realistic is

It still holds the franchisee

responsible for operation but allows flexibility for events
like extended time for personal business.
46.

COMPETITIVE BUSINESS - This provision prevents the

franchisee from entering a business that is similar to the
one he is already operating during the life of the contract.
Many contracts specify that a former franchisee may not
participate in a similar franchise business for a specific
amount of years and/or miles from a former site.
also include international businesses.

This may

At times this provi

sion can be vague in the interpretation of what is competi
tive business.

Some may think that if one is operating a

hamburger business, and desires to open a chicken business
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within the same geographical area, the chicken business
would be competitive because it may take some of the profit
that would have otherwise gone to the hamburger establish
ment.

The competitive business provision needs to be

clearly defined to preclude possible over-restriction and
denials.
47.

RESTRICTIONS ON SALE OF GOODS - This clause is included

to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized selling of
trade mixes and material.

In the fast food business, this

is highly unlikely because the franchisor, not the fran
chisee distributes the trade mixes, batters and material.
The absence of the provision in any of the 26 reviewed
contracts is indicative of this.
48.

PRODUCT SERVICE - This provision outlines the terms and

conditions under which the franchisee will honor guarantees
bn products sold or work done by another franchisee of the
system.

This provision was not present in any of the con

tracts reviewed.
49.

SALES QUOTA - This provision requires the franchisee to

meet and maintain a sales quota.

There were no contracts

with this provision present.
50.

GUARANTEED SALES - The previous provision put pressure

on the franchisee to maintain sales.

In this provision the

franchisor has placed himself under pressure by telling the
franchisee, or indicating that the franchisee is guaranteed
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a certain sales volume in that particular franchise system.
As in the previous provision, it would be highly foolish to
make such guarantees and so none were found within the scope
of the research.

PROVISIONS OF UNIFORMITY
51.

PHYSICAL LAYOUT APPROVAL - As mentioned in the distinc

tive architecture provision, fast food franchises normally
require a specific design to the inside and outside of the
facility.

The provision requires the franchisee request

permission from the franchisor to change any aspect of the
facility in which they operate.

The possible event of

unfairness generally occurs when the franchisor withholds
his permission without just cause or delays in giving per
mission for the change.
52.

LOCAL VARIATIONS PERMITTED - This provision provides

the franchisee some flexibility in making changes without
prior approval from the franchisor.

Examples of this would

be requirements from local law or building codes where the
franchisee has no choice but to make the change or close
down.

Although it would seem that this provision would be

beneficial for both franchisor and franchisee, only three
contracts contained this clause.
53 - 54.

DAYS AND HOURS OPEN - Under this provision the

franchisor specifies what hours and days the franchisee has
to operate.

A typical clause will state, "Licensee shall
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operate seven days per week during the hours of
to 11.00 p.m. Monday thru Sunday” .

10:00

a.m.

Operating under these

conditions could actually cause profit loss if the fran
chisee is made to operate the business in unprofitable hours
or days.

The decision when to operate should be left to the

franchisee.

Such directives create questions as to the

franchisor's motives in specifying exact dates and hours the
franchisee has to operate.

The most sensible explanation

would probably be to maximize the franchisee's sales which
in turn increases the franchisor's royalties.

Who else

knows what is right for the business?
55.

PRODUCT LINE - To ensure uniformity throughout the

franchise system, the franchisor institutes standards in the
preparation of the product to be sold.

In the fast food

industry this means that a home office representative visits
a store and tests the products to ensure they meet required
standards specified by the company's standards.

The purpose

of this provision is to maintain adequate quality in the
product that is sold.
56.

PRICE CONTROL - This provision grants the franchisor

control in setting price on the products sold by the fran
chisee.
fail.

This condition could actually cause the business to
This condition is most unfair in not allowing the

franchisee the chance to be competitive as deemed appro
priate for the geographical market.

Once again the motive
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for a franchisor to include this provision would be to
maximize royalties.
57.

ALTERATION APPROVAL - This provision states that the

franchisee cannot make any addition or alteration to the
building, parking lot of surrounding area without prior
approval from the franchisor.

While it is understandable

that the franchisor wants uniformity in the franchise sys
tem, this provision could be used as a tool to overcontrol
franchisees.

Great care should be exercised in the applica

tion of this provision if it is to be mutually beneficial to
both parties.

PROVISIONS. QILJ3CCÜPANCY
58.

FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY - In this agreement,

the franchisee may own the land and/or building.

If the

franchisee has the resources, it may be appropriate to own
the property as it provides an additional incentive to
succeed.
59.

FRANCHISOR OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY - This agreement

allows the franchisor the right to own the land and/or
building.

In this situation the franchisee will have to

rent or lease from the franchisor.

This, however, will

allow the franchisor an opportunity to exert a little more
control over the franchisee.

If the franchisee is willing
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to accept the additional control, this provision could be
more economical in the long-run.
60.

FRANCHISOR LEASES PROPERTY - Frequently the franchisor

will own the land and lease it through a third party through
a sublease with the franchisee.

The terms of the lease

generally run concurrent with the term of the contractual
franchise agreement.

Wherein the franchisor holds the

master lease, the franchisee may be subjected to greater
control.

However, this arrangement could also be beneficial

to the franchisee by having the franchisor assume the risks
involved in leasing property.
61.

FRANCHISEE LEASES PROPERTY - This provision provides

the franchisee the opportunity to lease land and/or
buildings from a third party.

The franchisor may or may not

be part of the lease agreement.
62.

LEASE APPROVAL - If the franchisee elects to lease

property from a third party, the franchisor may insist upon
prior approval.

The franchisor generally has greater exper

tise in evaluation terms in lease agreements which may work
to the benefit of the franchisee.

The provision can be

unfair if the franchisor uses the provision to insert condi
tions in the lease agreement that would be unfavorable to
the franchisee.
63.

NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE - In addition to requiring

franchisor approval of the franchisee's lease, the franchise
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agreement may also require the lessor (franchisee) to notify
the franchisor of any lease violation.

A similar clause

provides that the franchisor may correct the lease violation
at the franchisee's expense and, in some cases, without his
approval.

If the franchisee fails to reimburse the fran

chisor, the franchise agreement can be terminated.

This

provision should be included whenever the franchisee holds
the lease.

In addition, the same privilege should be

extended to the franchisee when the franchisor holds the
lease.
j64.

LEASE BACK ARRANGEMENTS - This provision specifies that

JLt the franchisee either owns or leases the property from a
third party, the franchisee will either assign the lease or
lease the property to the franchisor.
tions of this provision may vary.

The terms and condi

A variation of this

provision requires "assignment of said lease or sublease
which shall be held by the franchisor as collateral for the
faithful performance by franchisor of . . . the covenants of
the franchise a g r e e m e n t " S u c h assignment permits the
franchisor, at its option, to assume the franchisee's posi
tion thereunder; and the lessor may rely upon the
franchisor's written statement that it has done so without
confirmation by the franchisee.
Lease back arrangements are among the most potentially
unfair of all the provisions found in franchise agreements.
It seems the purpose of this agreement is to increase
the franchisor's control over the franchisee.

The fran-
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chisor can use the provision to increase his control by
threatening to evict the franchisee from the premises which
the franchisee owns or leases.

The franchisor may elect to

take over the operation and continue payments under the
terms of the lease.

This provision should be totally elimi

nated from contract agreements.
65.

LEASE - LOSS - If the franchisee violates or loses his

leasey the franchisor may terminate the agreement, according
to this provision.

In effect, this provision makes the

lease a part of the franchise agreement.

In some cases,

termination of the agreement is immediate upon the loss of
the lease.

The franchisee is not given the opportunity to

find another suitable location.

Under such terms the fran

chise is valid for only one location and upon loss of that
location, the franchise relationship is ended.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE FRANCHISOR
66

.

TO ANALYZE REPORTS - The franchisor agrees to analyze

the franchisee's reports and to advise him of any deviations
from the norm.

If the franchisor requires the franchisee to

submit regular reports, the franchisor should be required to
analyze those reports and make a report of the analysis to
the franchisee.

This information can be extremely valuable

to the franchisee who wishes to improve his operation.
Needless to say, analyzing the reports would probably occur
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without this provision.

The value of this provision is the

requirement of the franchisor to report his findings.
67.

TO ADVERTISE - This provision states that the fran

chisor agrees to advertise on behalf of the franchisee.

The

franchisor can stipulate that the franchisee has no right,
claim, or interest of any kind in or to any advertising fee
paid to the franchisor.

In other cases the franchisor may

agree to allocate the fee paid by the franchisee on a
reasonable basis for the promotion of the System for the
benefit of all franchisees.

Allocation may be determined by

percentage of gross sales based on the number of franchisees
in the System.
68

.

TO ACCOUNT FOR ADVERTISING FUNDS - Under this agree

ment, the franchisor has to account for the expenditure of
all advertising fees paid by the franchisee.

The terms

generally require the franchisor to report to the franchisee
on a regularly scheduled basis.

This agreement may specify

how the funds may be spent, i.e., for national or regional
advertising.
69.

TO ADVISE AND CONSULT - Many franchisors agree to

advise and consult with the franchisee on the operation of
the franchise business.

Some agreements place specific

limits on the number of requests that can be made by the
franchisee and areas advice can be given.

Franchisees may
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be required to reimburse franchisors when consultation
sessions exceed the allotted number.
70.

TO INSPECT - This clause requires the franchisor to

inspect the franchisee's operation.

Some provisions require

the franchisor to give the franchisee a written notice of
findings while other allow verbal notice.

If this clause

did not exist, in all probability the franchisor would
inspect the operation anyway.

The difference is that with

this provision the franchisor gives formal results.
71.

TO ADVISE FRANCHISEE OF CHANGES - This provision states

that the franchisor will make available to a franchisee all
services, facilities, privileges made to all other
franchisees, keep the franchisee advised of all new develop
ments, improvements and innovations in methods, processes
and systems.

While this provision has no inherent unfair

ness, it is the Operations Manual that often receives these
changes.

This clause could be potentially detrimental by

giving the franchisor unlimited latitude to make changes or
no changes at all, thus limiting the franchisee's competi
tiveness.
72.

GRAND OPENING ASSISTANCE - Franchise agreements may

specify that the franchisor provide grand opening assistance
to the franchisee.

To the new franchisee, the opening day

may be most critical.

If the franchisor does not provide

support at this time, the relationship may be permanently
damaged.

The franchisor may bear the cost of supplying the
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assistance or the franchisee may be required to pay for the
help.

Many contracts extracted the cost of assistance from

the initial franchise fee.

Most provisions of this type are

vague in outlining the number of days and hours assistance
will be provided at no cost to the franchisee.
It would be best if the franchisor stated exact daily
or hourly rates to be charged.

Unfortunately, many fran

chisors promise assistance and do not execute their promise.
The franchisee is then forced to accept non-compliance or
take legal action.

BOOKKEEPING PROVISIONS
73.

BANK APPROVAL - A few franchise agreements require that

the franchisee must use a bank designated by the franchisor.
The franchisee may be required to deposit all daily receipts
of the business in a bank designated by the franchisor.

In

this review, only one franchisor applied this provision.
74.

BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM APPROVAL - If a franchisee desires

to implement a bookkeeping system of his own or the fran
chisor has not designated one, the franchisee has to let the
franchisor review the system for approval prior to using the
system.

Some agreements only require the franchisee use a

system in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.
75.

FRANCHISOR BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM REQUIRED - The franchisee

is required to use a bookkeeping system determined by the
73
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franchisor.

The provision should not be considered unreas

onable if the purpose is to facilitate the analysis of the
franchisor's operation.

But if the system does not play an

integral role in helping the franchisee to manage his fran
chise# the provision is questionable.
76.

ANNUAL CERTIFIED AUDIT - Many franchisors require their

franchisees to submit certified audits of their records on
an annual or bi-annual basis.

This agreement does two

things? it forces the franchisee to keep some form of
records, and secondly, it reduces the opportunity for the
franchisee, to understate his sales to the franchisor.
77.

RIGHT TO AUDIT BOOKS - This provision gives the fran

chisor the right to audit the books of the franchisee.

Some

agreements set the frequency of audits as "at any time"; "at
any reasonable time"; or "during the normal business hours
of the franchisee's operation".

This provision is

reasonable as long as the audits are not a form of harassing
the franchisee.
78.

MARGIN OF ERROR - Certain penalties are doled out if

the records are found in error compared with the report
submitted

by the franchisee.

The error can be defined as a

fixed amount or a percentage of what was reported to the
franchisor.

If the franchisee's records are found to be

over the specified amount or percentage, he usually is
required to pay all unpaid royalties with interest for the
days the unpaid portion was outstanding.

Repeated negli-
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gence on the part of the franchisee is a substantial viola
tion of the agreement and could be grounds for termination.
79.

FEDERAL INCOME TAX COPY - This provision forces the

franchisee into supplying the franchisor a copy of his
federal income tax return.

Some agreements may specify that

only the portion of the tax return pertaining to the fran
chised business be furnished to the franchisor.

This provi

sion is based on the assumption that some franchisees may
attempt to cheat the franchisor but be reluctant to lie to
the Internal Revenue Service.

The agreement has caused some

controversy because many franchisees feel that their per
sonal financial matters are private.

According to the

Internal Revenue Service, there is nothing illegal about
this provision because the individual is free to do as he
pleases with his copy of the tax return.
80.

PERIODIC REPORTS - Franchisors frequently require the

franchisee to submit monthly profit and loss statements,
sales reports, balance sheets, inventory reports, etc.

From

the franchisor's point of view, these reports are essential
in evaluating the franchisee's progress.

On the other hand,

the franchisee may feel some discontent because it seems the
reports are the result of the franchisor's failure to
properly analyze the already required reports and communi
cate their result back to the franchisee.
81 - 82.

CASH AND/OR PROFIT WITHDRAWAL - This provision

limits the amount of cash and profits that the franchisee
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may take out of his franchised business within a specific
period of time.

This provision was not found in any of the

contracts reviewed.
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND TRAINING
83.

EMPLOYEE UNIFORMS - Most common in the fast food

industry is the desire for uniformity within the company
system.

The employee's uniform must conform to the

specified color and design set by the franchisor.

The

franchisee is responsible for providing the uniform to all
employees.

Many contracts will designate this clause while

others are vague or say very little at all.

Most often, the

franchisee will find that employee uniforms are mentioned in
the operations manual and not within the contract pro
visions.

This is unfair since the franchisee will not see

the manual until after he has signed the agreement.

The

franchisor should state all provisions within the contract
and not give the franchisee additional requirements hidden
in a document not furnished during the initial signing of
the agreement.
84.

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT - This clause simply relates to how

the franchisee and his employees will conduct themselves
while on duty.

For example, the franchisor will state "the

employee shall at all times while on duty represent a neat
and clean appearance and render competent, sober, and cour
teous service".

There are some provisions that venture in

the arena of ethical behavior.

The trouble with these types
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of agreements is the interpretation of what or how clean is
clean.
85.

What meter does one use to gauge competent service?

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES - Some franchisors retain the right

to specify the number of employees that must be on duty at
any time.

There are some franchisors who think their fran

chisee may reduce the number of employees on duty to cut
costs and that such cost cutting would result in poor ser
vice.

It should be understood that good service is not

guaranteed just because there is a full staff on duty.

It

would be most unfair to require the franchisee to maintain a
staff larger than necessary.
86

.

RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE - This provision provides that

the franchisor may dismiss the franchisee's employees.

In

some cases this right is extended to the hiring of employees
as well.

Another contract requires the franchisee to con

sult with the franchisor on hiring of employees.
provision is most demeaning to the franchisee.

This
If one is

running a business, he/she has the right to hire and fire as
they see fit.
87.

FRANCHISEE FORMAL TRAINING - The majority of the con

tracts require formal training of the franchisee prior to
actual operation of the business.

This provision normally

states the location, length of time, and conditions under
which the training will be administered.

There may be somé

stipulations to this provision regarding completion of the
formal training by the franchisee.

Some agreements will
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specify, "If the franchisee fails to complete the formal
training, a competent individual will be designated to
attend the formal training and this individual will manage
the franchised business".

Franchisees may have to pay for

travel and meals in most cases, but the training itself is
part of the package deal.

Some contracts will use some of

the franchise fee as payment for the training, but the
franchisee bears the travel and lodging expense.

There are

a few agreements that are extreme and stipulate termination
if the franchisee fails the formal training.
8 8

.

REFRESHER COURSE - This provision requires the

franchisee to attend a refresher course similar to the
initial formal training or to attend periodic conferences
sponsored by the franchisor.

The franchisee pays for

travel, food and lodging, and sometimes the franchisee is
required to pay fees for guest speakers.
89.

TRAINING OF SUBSEQUENT MANAGERS - Frequently, the

franchise agreements provide that if the manager of a
franchise operation is replaced, the replacement manager
will attend the formal training course.

Once again, the

franchisee is responsible for all salary, travel, and
lodgings expenses-

In addition, the franchisee may be

required to reimburse the franchisor for training expenses.
90.

TRAINING OF KEY EMPLOYEES - This provision mirrors the

previous one, except it pertains to those personnel who
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would be considered key figures in the operation of the
business.
91.

ALL EMPLOYEE TRAINING - This agreements requires the

franchisee to train all employees.

In most systems, the

employees are not required to attend formal training.
Instead, a training program in operation of the business may
be given at the actual location of business.
92.

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE - Some franchisors

do not require their franchisees to complete a formal
training program, but instead provide on-the-job training.
Such training may take place at the franchisee's place of
business, at company headquarters, or at any company owned
operation designated by the franchisor.

INSURANCE PROVISIONS
93.

FRANCHISOR ADMINISTRATION - This provision makes the

franchisor responsible for ascertaining that the franchisee
has adequate insurance.

Under the terms of this provision

the franchisor may procure and maintain insurance for the
franchisee at the franchisee's expense.

If the franchisor

is in a position to benefit financially by administering the
franchisee's insurance programs, there is a conflict of
interest, and an unfair situation may exist.

However, since

there are other methods of ascertaining that the franchisee
is adequately insured, this provision is not recommended.
Group insurance can be administered by the insurance company
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and should be free from franchisor intervention.
94.

FRANCHISOR CO-INSURED - Frequently the franchise agree

ment requires the franchisee include the franchisor as an
additional policy holder at the option of the franchisor.
Generally the franchisor is given the right to designate and
determine the type of insurance policies and the coverage
there under which the franchisee shall purchase to protect
the interests of the franchisee and franchisor.

This

protects the franchisor in the event that he is named in any
lawsuit rising out of the franchisee's contact with
customers.

Some franchisors may compensate the franchisee

for the additional expenses.

However, in either case, the

provision appears to be fair, reasonable, and justifiable.
95.

CANCELLATION NOTICE - This agreement requires the

franchisee to include a requirement of notice to the fran
chisor of any violation or any termination of the
franchisee's insurance.

The franchisee's insurance company

may be required to provide from five to thirty days' notice
to the franchisor.

Should the franchisee default on the

insurance, some agreements give the franchisor the authority
to make premium payments and/or procure and maintain the
insurance.

This provision is an effective method of guaran

teeing that the franchisee maintains a proper level of
insurance.

Cancellation notices are superior to actual

administration of the franchisee's insurance because there
is little question of a conflict of interest.
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96.

APPROVAL OF FRANCHISEE'S INSURANCE COMPANY - Terms of

provision require the franchisee to obtain insurance from a
company the franchisor approves.

As long as the fran

chisor's approval is limited to approving the insurance
company according to stated and recognized standards, such
as Best's "AAA", the provision is fair.
97.

PROOF OF INSURANCE - Some franchisors require the

franchisee furnish proof that he has obtained the required
insurance.

This provision is frequently used in lieu of

franchisor administration of the franchisee's insurance
program.

Proof of insurance requirements often accompanies

provisions dealing with cancellation notices and administra
tion.

This provision requires less administration by the

franchisor and exerts less control than direct administra
tion, yet it accomplishes the same objective.
-9:3 -

103

. TYPES OF INSURANCE - This provision requires the

franchisee to keep in force several types of insurance,
including business interruption. Workers' Compensation, and
personal, employer, property, and product liability
insurance.
another.

The amounts and types vary from one contract to
While there is some possibility that the

franchisor may require the franchisee to be overinsured,
required insurance is in the best interest of both parties.
PURCHASING
This group of provisions is concerned with the conditions
and circumstances under which the franchisee purchases the
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various products and supplies needed for the operation of
the franchise.

There are several conditions that may be

optional or mandatory when purchasing items.

Some fran

chisors will make it clear that they are not a supplier, but
supplies the franchisee purchases must meet standards set by
the franchisor.

Some franchisors give the franchisee the

option to purchase supplies from the home office, or seek an
independent dealer, so long as the supplies meet company
standards.

Other franchisors require the franchisee to buy

all supplies from the home office.

This last condition,

although not unethical, can be and sometimes is no more than
an opportunity for the franchisor to profit from the pur
chases made by the franchisee.

As this could become a

conflict of interest, the franchisor should be careful that
he/she is not profiteering at the franchisee's expense.

To

eliminate distrust, conditions where the franchisee must buy
from the franchisor should be totally banned from the
agreement.

The exception would be when the item is a unique

specialty such as batter and mixes.
104 - 107.

PAPER GOODS - Paper goods include all the

specialty paper products used in quantity by the franchisee.
Normally, these products carry the identification of
the franchise system.

They include paper cups, plates, and

napkins used in the fast food operation.
108 - 111.

OPERATING SUPPLIES AND SERVICES - Operating

supplies and services are products and services used by the
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franchisee on a daily basis to provide his customers with
the products or services appropriate to his franchise.
While some operating supplies may be common to almost all
franchisees, others may be restricted to a single franchise
system, i.e. special spices and branded products.

These are

known as common and specialized products, respectively.
Between the two extremes are the relatively stand
ardized products or services used by most of those engaged
in providing the same type of products or services.
112 - 114.

EQUIPMENT - The franchisee's equipment needs may

also be divided into common, specialty, or standardized
equipment needs.

Some franchise systems have been construc

ted around an equipment package manufactured or sold by the
franchisor.
equipment.

These items may be classed as specialty
Branded products which are not unique to the

system, may be categorized as either standardized or common
equipment needs.
115 - 117.

SIGNS - Signs include indoor and outdoor display

and sales promotion devices which are permanent or semi
permanent.

They, too, may be grouped according to the

preceding three-way classification system.

Most signs

are custom-made for à particular franchise system and can be
classed as either custom or standardized.
118. PRICE RESTRICTION - If the franchisee is required to
purchase common or standardized goods from the franchisor or
his designated suppliers, the franchise agreement may
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contain a provision limiting the prices and pricing policies
of the franchisor.

The purpose of this provision is to

reduce the possibility that the franchisor will use his
position to charge the franchisee higher prices than can be
justified.
119. FRANCHISOR-VENDOR REBATES - Most franchise agreements
are silent on the issue of franchisor-vendor rebates.

The

rebate is somewhat like a kickback from the supplier to the
franchisor when the franchisee buys the vendor's supplies.
The rebate may tempt some franchisors to make their
franchisee purchase higher priced goods, thus a larger
rebate.

The franchisor's practice of taking rebates needs

to be eliminated because it creates an opportunity for the
franchisor to take unfair advantage of the franchisee.
120. VENDING APPROVAL - This provision requires franchisor
approval for the installation of vending machines on the
premises of a franchised establishment.
The agreements specify what percentage of the vending
income is to go to the franchisor and the vending company.
Other agreements may require the franchisee to include the
vending income in the gross receipts of the franchise
business thus be subject to any royalty payments based on a
percentage of sales.
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ADVERTISING
121. FRANCHISOR/FRANCHISEE ADVERTISING - The franchisor may
exert partial or total control over all of the franchisee's
advertising or a portion of it.

The franchisor may also

allow the franchisee total advertising freedom.

Generally,

the franchisor is better qualified than the franchisee to
plan and carry out national, and perhaps local, advertising
programs.

In some agreements, the franchisor and franchisee

may share responsibility in both concepts and financial
contributions of the advertising program.

The franchisor

may apply a one-for-one dollar contribution for each dollar
the franchisee applies to advertising.

The franchisor may

let the franchisee design his own regional advertisement and
submit it for approval by the franchisor.
122. RIGHT TO ENTER AND DESTROY - This provision gives the
franchisor or his agent the right to enter a franchised
establishment and remove any advertisements considered
objectionable without being charged with trespassing or
having to pay for what was removed.

This provision is one

of the most high-handed and offensive provisions found in
franchise agreements.

While the impact of this provision is

relatively minor, the negative effect upon the franchisee's
mind could be considerable.
123. SIGNS REQUIRED - We have all seen the signs inside and
outside our favorite fast food establishment.

Generally,

all franchisees are required to have these signs constructed
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to dimensions specified by the franchisor.

The franchisee

may have to purchase the signs from the franchisor or, given
the option, to purchase signs from an independent dealer.
If the franchisee wishes to use a substitute sign, he/she
must have prior approval from the franchisor.
124. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL OF ADVERTISING - Franchisees may be
given the freedom to prepare their own advertising, but may
be required to first obtain the franchisor's approval.
Because much local advertising is multi-market in its reach,
this provision appears to be appropriate under normal
conditions.
order.

Thus, some coordination would seem to be in

Provisions of this type should carry the condition

that franchisor approval will not be unreasonably withheld.
125. ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF COMMITTEE - This provision
stipulates that the franchisee must join either a national
or regional advertising committee or association.

The

provision may also outline the respective roles that the
franchisor, the committee, and the franchisee will play in
carrying out the system's advertising program.

Programming

through participation may be the best approach to central
ized advertising.

Unfortunately, only a few franchisors

have learned that participation management can be a highly
effective way to centralize advertising and to develop a
sense of involvement on the part of the franchisee.

If the

franchisor alone is responsible for all advertising, he is
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open to criticism and ill feeling.

Active participation can

increase communication and do much to reduce ill feelings.

PROVISIONS OF SALE OR TRANSFER
126. FRANCHISOR'S RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL - Both the
franchisee and the franchisor may be given the right of
first refusal in the franchise agreement.

Under the terms

of the franchisor's right of first refusal, if the
franchisee wishes to sell his franchised business, he must
first offer to sell to the franchisor.

In addition to these

terms, the right of refusal may also state that, "In the
event that the franchisor shall not exercise its option for
purchase as herein provided . . . "

the franchisee may sell

to a third party provided that he/she has had approval of
the sale from the franchisor.

The franchisee may be

required to give notice to the franchisor of any offer to
sell.

Included in this notice is the name, address, and all

terms and conditions of a bona fide offer.

If the

franchisor is willing to match any bona fide offer from a
third party, including goodwill payments, there does not
appear to be anything unfair about this provision.
127. FRANCHISEE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL - If the franchisor
wishes to establish an additional franchise within the
franchisee's exclusive territory or within a territory
stated in the franchise agreement, this provision may
specify the conditions under which the franchisor may issue
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a new franchise, the price of the new franchise, the terms
and conditions of the sale, and the protected territory of
the original franchise.

However, the criteria upon which

the new franchise unit is justified should be reasonable.
Unfortunately, this does not always appear to be the case.
In some cases franchisees are forced to open new franchises
where they are not warranted.
128

UNLIMITED RIGHT OF INHERITANCE - Under this provision,

if the franchisee dies, his heirs have virtually an
unlimited right of inheritance to the franchise business.
The franchisor, however, may require the heir enter into a
written agreement with the franchisor under the current
contract conditions.

This interferes with the original

purpose of the provisions because the business is not in
herited as is, but under a new contract as if the heir is a
new franchisee.

Other agreements allow inheritance as long

as it is limited to members of the franchisee's family.

In

some cases, gifts or transfers by reason of death are not to
be considered a transfer or assignment, thus not requiring
fees for transfers.

The basic question appears to be, do

both the franchisor and franchisee have rights that should
be protected in the event of the franchisee's death?

The

question does cause conflict, but if the heirs are competent
managers or can hire competent managers, they should be
permitted to inherit the franchised business.
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129. LIMITED RIGHT OF INHERITANCE - This provision is the
same as the preceding one except the heirs have to pay a
transfer fee or receive the franchisor's approval, thus
limiting the right of inheritance.
130. NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE - As the provision title indi
cates some franchisors state flatly that the franchisee's
heirs have no right to inherit the business because the
agreement is a personal one between the franchisor and
franchisee.

Some agreements state that the heir must sell

the operation to the franchisor at the franchisor's option.
Most franchisees find this provision objectionable.

It

strips the franchisee of the right to pass the business
along and forces the heir to sell the business to the fran
chisor at a price possibly below market value.
131. FRANCHISOR RIGHT OF APPROVAL OF SALE - If the fran
chisee has an opportunity to sell his franchise, he may be
required to obtain the franchisor's approval of the prospec
tive buyer.

The franchisor may further stipulate that the

purchaser be reputable and financially responsible and
complete the company training program.

Some require the

franchisee pay a sum to defray the franchisor's expenses
incidental to the transfer of the franchise and the training
of the new franchisee.

Ironically, there is practically no

franchisee right of first approval of sale.

Many fran

chisors are silent on this point, in fact most state that
the franchisor has the right to sell the franchise system
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any time he/she chooses.
interest.

There seems to be a conflict of

If the franchisee is to have his freedom, the

franchisor must be restricted.

On the other hand, if the

franchisor's rights are totally protected, the franchisee
must suffer.

A compromise is in order.

In addition, if the

franchisee has to gain approval, the approval should not be
unreasonably withheld.
132. NO FOR SALE ADVERTISING - Under this provision the
franchisor prohibits the franchisee from making any public
offer to sell, transfer, assign, lease, or sublet of the
franchise business through any medium of public advertising.
Many franchisees feel this provision is unfair in that it
lowers the selling price to the franchisor under the right
of first refusal because the franchisee cannot advertise for
a competitive price for the business.
133. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS - If the franchisor wishes to
sell his franchise to a third party, that person is gener
ally bound by the terms of the franchise agreement.
may also apply to the heirs of the franchisee.

This

In some

cases, either the heir or the purchaser may be required to
sign a current franchise agreement.

This provision is a

just and perhaps an essential protection of the franchisor's
rights.

There seems to be no chance for this provision to

be used in an unfair manner.

It may be included at the

franchisor's option.
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134, STOCK TRANSFER APPROVAL - This provision sets forth the
conditions under which the franchisee may assign an interest
in the franchise or transfer stock if the franchisee has
incorporated his business.

In some cases the franchisee may

transfer up to ten percent of the stock or interest in the
franchise without approval, while other agreements state
that transfer is allowable as long as the franchisee has the
controlling interest of 51 percent.

Still other contracts

require franchisor prior approval before any portion of
stock or interest is transferred.

Most franchisors require

a list of all stockholders and that the stockholders sign an
agreement hot to compete.
125. NO GOODWILL PAYMENTS - Should the franchisee elect or
be forced to sell the franchise or its physical assets to
the franchisor, this provision stipulates that the
franchisee is prohibited from including payment of goodwill
in the selling price.

This provision may be implied and not

specifically stated in the contract.

It is obvious that the

purpose of this agreement is to reduce the repurchase price
of an ongoing franchise.

CONDITIONS AND TERMS OF TERMINATION
136. FAILURE TO PAY - Under this provision, many franchisees
agree to pay all bills, debts and financial obligations.
Should the franchisee violate the agreement to pay, it is
considered a material breach of the contract and grounds for
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termination.

if strictly interpreted, this provision may be

used to cut off the franchisee's defense of withholding
payments from his franchisor in case of non-performance on
the part of the franchisor.

The provision may even be

extended to the franchisee's suppliers in some contracts.
This is an unfair provision because it eliminates the fran
chisee's most effective tool for correcting inequities.
137 - 138.

FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RIGHT TO EARLY TERMINATION

The right to terminate the franchise agreement is sometimes
extended to the franchisee.

This provision states the

conditions and terms under which the franchisee may ter
minate the contract.

In some cases the franchisee's right

is relatively unrestricted.

In other cases the franchisor

may specifically deny the franchisee's right to early ter
mination.

In these types of cases, the franchisee's ter

mination may be treated as a default.

Generally, if the

franchisee desires to terminate the contract, he is subject
to numerous conditions pertaining to the termination.

On

the other hand, the franchisor is also allowed to terminate
the contract early, but with fewer stipulations applied
compared with the franchisee.

There is a marked difference

between the franchisee's and the franchisor's right to early
termination.
about

22

Some franchisee termination provisions can be

percent of the entire contractual agreement, while

the franchisor's termination provisions in some contracts
take up 48 percent of the entire contract.

The franchisee
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may be required to give a thirty day notice of early ter
mination and in most contracts ^ the franchisor does not have
to give any notice at all.

This provision provides the

right of early termination to both parties, but the
franchisor is not required to give the same notices or be
subject to the same stipulations as the franchisee.

To make

the entire provision fair, the franchisor should have the
same requirements as the franchisee.
139. TERMINATION FOR ANY VIOLATION - This provision gives
the franchisor the unlimited right to terminate the contract
for any violation, large or small, that the franchisee
commits.

This provision may disallow discussions or com

promises.

The franchisee is given no course to redress the

issue, one is given no chance to make corrections.

Termina

tion can be for any violation of one or more of the provi
sions previously reviewed.

If tested in a court of law,

such provisions may prove to be unenforceable.
Even if this provision is not used against the
franchisee, its presence in the agreement
undesirable for two reasons.

First,

is unfair and

the franchisor may use

the threat of termination to force his will upon the
franchisee.

Second, franchisees may feel oppressed and

threatened by the presence of such a provision.
140 - 143.

TERMINATION FOR BANKRUPTCY, VIOLATION OF

STANDARDS, TRAINING FAILURE - These provisions provide the
means of termination should the franchisee become bankrupt.
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or violate set standards.

The franchisee is usually not

terminated for one violation of set standards.

Normally,

the franchise is guilty of several violations.

Termination

due to failing the training program is not common since most
franchisors require the prospective franchisee assign an
alternate person should the franchisee fail the training
program.

This provision can be unfair if the franchisor

does not specify the exact conditions and terms under which
the franchisee may be terminated.
144 - 146.

IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION AND GRACE PERIOD - Under

this provision, the franchisor can terminate the franchise
agreement without prior notice or without the benefit of a
grace period.

In some cases, immediate cancellation is

sometimes limited to specific events or violations.

The

grace period is the amount of time the franchisee has to
correct a deficiency after notification of violation before
the franchisor can terminate the agreement.
varies from sixty days to twenty-four hours.

The length
This provision

is unfair in that the franchisee should have the right to an
appeal.

Under this provision, the franchisee has no such

right.
FRANCHISEE OBLIGATION AFTER TERMINATION
147 - 148.

COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE - When the franchisee's

agreement has been terminated, this provision stipulates
that the franchisee will not engage in a similar business
for a stated period of time and/or within a stated distance
94
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from his former franchise business.

The distance may range

from one to fifty miles and the time from one to ten years.
While it does not seem to be unreasonable for the franchisor
to receive protection from the direct competition of former
franchisees, this provision may strip the franchisee of his
means to a livelihood.

This provision may not be enforce

able in a court of law since it does strip the former fran
chisee of some possible livelihood.

Besides, the franchisor

has no more right to this kind of protection than any other
businessman whose employees leave to enter a competitive
business.
149. COVENANT NOT TO HIRE - This provision deals most with
business ethics.

It states that if some other franchise

terminates within the system, the franchisee will not hire
the employees or agents of either the franchisor or other
franchisee.

This is understandable if employee stealing is

to be averted.

The provision may be enforced during the

life of the agreement, not just at termination.
150. COVENANT NOT TO USE SYSTEM - This provision is similar
to the covenants not to compete.
more limited in scope.

However, it is somewhat

Whereas a covenant not to compete

may forbid the franchisee to engage in a similar business,
this covenant specifically prohibits the franchisee from
using the franchisor's system.

Note that this provision

does not prohibit the franchisee from opening a similar, but
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independent business or from joining another, but similar,
franchised system.
151. COVENANT TO CEASE OPERATIONS - If the franchise agree
ment is terminated for any reason, this provision may
require that the franchisee cease all operations imme
diately.

Coupled with an immediate cancellation clause or a

very short notice of termination, this provision is
extremely harsh on the franchisee and his/her employees.
However, if the franchisee has had a proper thirty day
notice, this provision is less harsh giving the franchisee
the opportunity to liquidate or adjust his operation and/or
allow his employees to look for employment elsewhere.
152. COVENANT TO CHANGE BUILDINGS - After termination, the
franchisee may be required to change the color scheme,
layout or interior furnishing to reflect no association with
the former franchise business.

Normally the franchisee is

given a specific time limit to make these changes after
termination.
153. COVENANT TO REMOVE SIGNS - Under the terms of the
covenant, the franchisee agrees to cease using any trade
marks, service marks, emblems, displays or advertisements
with the franchisor's name imprinted on them upon termina
tion.

The franchisee also agrees to remove any of the items

mentioned above from the premises.

This provision appears

to be fair and appropriate, provided that the party respon
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slble for the termination pays the cost of removing the
signs.
154. COST OF ENFORCEMENT - This provision provides that if
the franchisee defaults or fails to satisfactorily perform
any of the preceding covenants, the franchisor may cure any
such breaches at the franchisee's expense.

If the agreement

has been fairly terminated, provisions of this type appear
to be relatively reasonable.
tion.

There is, however, one excep

If the franchise agreement has been terminated by the

franchisor,for reason of franchisor non-performance, this
provision and the preceding covenants should not apply.

The

franchisor^, by his act of non-performance should forfeit his
right to these protections.

PROVISIONS OF SALE AFTER TERMINATION
Frequently, the franchise agreement will specify that
after termination the franchisee may or must sell specified
physical assets to the franchisor.

In some cases these

provisions permitted the franchisor to purchase the fran
chisee's on-going business by purchasing the physical
assets.

For example, if the franchisor holds the master

lease or the lease is assignable, the franchisor may pur
chase the equipment, signs, and supplies of a terminated
franchise and continue the operation.
155 - 158.

THE BUY BACK PROVISIONS - These final provisions

are sometimes referred to as "buy back" clauses because they
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set the terms and conditions under which the franchisor may
purchase the physical assets of a terminated franchise.
Some "buy back" clauses are all-inclusive and can be fair or
unfair.

The assets can be all or portions of equipment,

signs, trademark supplies, or r e ^ l a r supplies.

Financial

terms may be from book value, straight line depreciation,
fair market value or double declining balance in estab
lishing selling price.

Many contracts give the franchisor

the right to deduct any portion the franchisee owes to the
franchisor from outstanding debts.

Since the franchisor

sets the price of the buy back, one may feel there is some
unfair dealing when the franchisee has some outstanding
debts.

It is believed that the franchisor sets the buy back

price so that after deducting the franchisee's outstanding
debts, there is a very small dollar amount paid for the
equipment and supplies in the buy back.

It should be under

stood that the franchisor does not have to buy back any
item.
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APPENDIX II

LETTER OF SOLICITATION
Dear (Company),
Seventeen years ago the Small Business Administration
(SEA) sponsored a study of Franchising. A spin-off of that
effort was an analysis of the contractual elements of fran
chising.
Since then franchising has changed considerably.
We are currently engaged in an effort to find out how
these changes have affected the franchise agreement. We
intend to compare the agreements of the late 1960s to those
currently in use.
In order to do this we need your cooperation in the
form of one of your present agreements that would be issued
to a prospective franchiseeThis information will be kept
confidential and no franchisor will be identified with
specific provisions reported in our final report. The
methodology will be similar to that used in the Franchise
Agreement Handbook published by Purdue Univ. in 1971.
I am a Captain in the United States Air Force assigned
to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota.
In addition to my duties
as a Command Post Controller, I am currently working on a
Master of Business Administration.
This study is part of
the final requirement for my graduation.
This study is being supervised by Dr. Gerald G. Udell,
who was part of the study team for the original SBA spon
sored study at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.
Dr. Udell also authored the Franchise Agreement Handbook.
This study is endorsed by the International Franchise
Association and your cooperation would be greatly
appreciated.
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APPENDIX III
FREQUENCY OF PROVISIONS' OCCURRENCE
(Based upon contracts of 26 franchisor organization)
PAYMENTS TO THE FRANCHISOR PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent

1

.

FRANCHISE FEE

26

100

2

.

NON-REFUNDABLE FEES

14

54

3.

ROYALTY

23

88

4.

NATIONAL ADVERTISING

23

88

5.

LOCAL ADVERTISING

16

62

.

RENEWAL FEE

10

30

7.

SERVICE FEE

7

27

RENTAL/LEASE PAYMENTS

8

31

RENT ADJUSTMENT

1

4

6

8

.

9.
10

.

PURCHASE PAYMENTS

2

8

11

.

INDIRECT PAYMENTS

0

0

12

.

SPECIAL PAYMENTS

15

58

13.

PENALTIES

17

65

14.

SECURITY DEPOSITS

0

0

15.

TERMINATION PENALTIES

1

4
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GENERAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent

16.

LENGTH OF CONTRACT TERMS

23

88

17.

OPTION TO RENEW

18

69

18.

EXCLUSIVE TERRITORY

17

63

19.

START UP DATE

12

46

20.

FRANCHISOR CONFIDENTIAL
DISCLOSURE

2

8

21.

FRANCHISEE CONFIDENTIAL
DISCLOSURE

15

58

22.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

21

81

23.

HOLD HARMLESS

18

69

24.

ACT OF GOD

4

15

25.

NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT

19

73

26.

ILLEGAL COVENANT

18

69

27.

LEGAL BUSINESS

2

8

28.

FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATION
FORBIDDEN

0

0

29.

RIGHT TO FUTURE
REVISION

20

77

30.

OPERATING MANUAL

21

81

31.

GOODWILL PAYMENTS

1

4

32.

CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCY

15

58

33.

COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL LAWS

15

58

34.

FRANCHISE DISABILITY

13

50

35.

ARBITRATION

12

46

36.

SITE SELECTION

16

62
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVTATONR
Number of
Contracts

Percent

37.

INCORPORATION PERMITTED

23

88

38.

TRADEMARK RESTRICTION

25

96

39.

DISTINCTIVE ARCHITECTURE

16

62

40.

GOOD ETHICS

12

46

41.

S^TATE OF INTERPRETATION

19

73

42.

VENUE CLAUSE

4

15

43.

SUB-FRANCHISING

1

4

44.

CIVIL RIGHTS

0

0

45.

FULL TIME

9

35

46 r 'COMPETITIVE BUSINESS

21

81

47.

RESTRICTION ON SALE OF
GOODS

0

0

48.

PRODUCT SERVICE

1

4

49.

SALES QUOTA

0

0

50.

GUARANTEED SALES

0

0

UNIFORMITY PROVISION
Number of
Contracts

Percent

18

69

3

12

51.

PHYSICAL LAYOUT APPROVAL

52.

LOCAL VARIATIONS PERMITTED

53.

DAYS OPEN

13

50

54.

HOURS OPEN

14

54

55.

PRODUCT LINE

20

77

56.

PRICE CONTROL

2

8

57.

ALTERNATION APPROVAL

16

62
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OCCUPANCY PROVISTONR
Number of
Contracts

E^ment

58.

FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP

3

12

59.

FRANCHISOR OWNERSHIP

5

19

60.

FRANCHISEE LEASES

61.

FRANCHISOR LEASES

5

19

62.

LEASE APPROVAL

6

23

63.

NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE

8

31

64.

LEASE BACK

7

27

65.

LEASE LOSS

21

11

81

42

OBLIGATIONS OF THE FRANCHISOR PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts
6 6

.

67.
6 8

.

69.

ANALYZE REPORTS
ADVERTISING
ACCOUNT FOR ADVERTISING
FUNDS
ADVISE AND CONSULT

.70-.. TNSPEGT -—

-

Percent

8

31

18

69

8

31

15

58

24

92

71.

ADVISE FRANCHISEE OF
CHANGES

17

65

72.

GRAND OPENING ASSISTANCE

17

65

BOOKKEEPING PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent

73.

BANK APPROVAL

1

4

74.

BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM
APPROVAL

7

27
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Number of
Contracts

Percent

75.

BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM
REQUIRED

16

62

76.

ANNUAL CERTIFIED AUDIT

12

46

77.

RIGHT TO AUDIT BOOKS

24

92

78.

MARGIN OF ERROR

18

69

79.

INCOME TAX COPY

8

31

80.

PERIODIC REPORTS

23

88

81.

CASH WITHDRAWAL

0

0

82.

PROFIT WITHDRAWAL

0

0

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND TRAINING PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent
42

83 .

EMPLOYEE UNIFORMS

84.

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT

7

27

85.

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

1

4

RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE

1

4

FRANCHISEE FORMAL
TRAINING

22

85

FRANCHISEE REFRESHER
COURSE

11

42

89.

SUBSEQUENT MANAGER
TRAINING

18

69

90.

KEY EMPLOYEE TRAINING

10

39

91.

ALL EMPLOYEE TRAINING

2

8

92.

OJT AND ASSISTANCE

7

27

8 6

.

87.
88

.

11

104
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INSURANCE PROVTRTnwg
Number of
Contracts
93.

FRANCHISOR ADMINISTRATION

94.

Percent

7

27

FRANCHISOR CO-INSURED

22

85

95.

CANCELLATION NOTICE

19

73

96.

APPROVAL OF COMPANY

12

46

97.

PROOF OF INSURANCE

23

88

98.

BUSINESS INTERRUPTION

5

19

99.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

18

69

12

46

100. PERSONAL
101.

EMPLOYER

LIABILITY

21

81

102.

PROPERTY

LIABILITY

24

92

103.

PRODUCT LIABILITY

21

81

PURCHASING PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent
19

104. PAPER GOODS-MAY BUY

0

105. PAPER GOODS-MUST BUY
106. PAPER GOODS-VENDOR
APPROVAL

10

39

107. PAPER GOODS-STANDARDS

21

81

3

12

108. OPERATING SUPPLIES MAY BUY

23

109. OPERATING SUPPLIES MUST BUY
10

110. OPERATING SUPPLIES VENDOR APPROVAL

105
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39

Number of
Contracts
111. OPERATING SUPPLIES STANDARDS

Percent

18

69

112. EQUIPMENT-MAY BUY

7

27

113. EQUIPMENT-MUST BUY

2

8

17

65

115. SIGNS-MAY/MUST BUY

3

12

116. SIGNS-VENDOR APPROVAL

6

23

17

65

118. PRICE RESTRICTIONS

0

0

119. FRANCHISOR-VENDOR
REBATE

3

12

12

46

114. EQUIPMENT-STANDARDS

117. SIGNS-STANDARDS

120^""VENDING APPROVAL
ADVERTISING PROVISIONS

Number of
Contracts

Percent

121. FRANCHISOR/FRANCHISEE
: : ■ ADVERTISING

10

39

122. RIGHT TO ENTER AND
DESTROY

13

50

123. SIGNS REQUIRED

17

65

124. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL

16

62

125. ADVERTISING COMMITTEE

10

39

SALE OR TRANSFER PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts
22

126. FRANCHISOR RIGHT OF
FIRST APPROVAL
127. FRANCHISEE RIGHT OF
FIRST APPROVAL
106
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Percent
85

Number of
Contracts
128. RIGHT OF INHERITANCE

Percent

13

50

129. LIMITED RIGHT OF
INHERITANCE

8

31

130. NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE

0

0

131. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL OF
SALE

20

132. NO FOR-SALE ADVERTISING

1

4

133. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS

13

50

134. STOCK TRANSFER APPROVAL

20

77

135. NO GOODWILL PAYMENTS

14

54

77

TERMINATION PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent

20

77

137. FRANCHISEE EARLY
TERMINATION

9

35

138. FRANCHISOR EARLY
TERMINATION

3

12

139. TERMINATION FOR
ANY VIOLATION

9

35

140. TERMINATION FOR
VIOLATION/STANDARDS

19

73

141. TERMINATION FOR
BANKRUPTCY

22

85

142. TERMINATION FOR
TRAINING FAILURE

4

15

143. IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION

7

27

144. GRACE PERIOD

1

4

136. FAILURE TO PAY
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Number of
Contracts

Percent

145. 10-DAY

10

39

146. 30-DAY

15

58

FRANCHISEE OBLIGATION AFTER TERMINATION PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent

147. COVENANT NOT TO
COMPETE-YEARS

19

73

148. COVENANT NOT TO
COMPETE-MILES

18

69

149. COVENANT NOT TO
HIRE

15

150. COVENANT NOT TO USE
SYSTEM

12

46

151. COVENANT TO CEASE
OPERATIONS

24

92

152. COVENANT TO CHANGE
BUILDING

15

58

153. COVENANT TO REMOVE
SIGNS

17

65

154. COST OF ENFORCEMENT

13

50

aAT.E AFTER TERMINATION PROVISIONS
Number of
Contracts

Percent

155. EQUIPMENT

12

46

156. SIGNS

12

46

157. TRADEMARK SUPPLIES

12

46

158. REGULAR SUPPLIES

12

46

108
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FOOTNOTES
^Henry S . Commager, Documents of American History
(New York; Appleton-Century-Croft, 1962), p.5.
^R.M. Rosenberg and M. Bedell, Profits from Franchising
(New York; McGraw-Hill Inc., 1969), p.9.
^Robert M. Goldenson, ed., "The Franchise Guide",
Princeton: Resource Publications. INC.. 1969, p.116 FF.
'Udell, 11-15, see Turabian, 9.137, p.161.
®U.S. Congress, "Senate Subcommittee on Urban and Rural
Economic Development of the Select Committee on Small
Business, 95th Congress", 2nd Sess., 1970, pp. 49-50.
®Ibid.
’Udell, 4-8.
“Ibid.
’Ibid.
^""Ibid.

^^Ibid.

James A. Murphy, "Franchising: New Problems With an
Old Concept", Bulletin of Business Research. Ohio State
University. Vol XIVI, No. 6 . June 1971, p.1.
13

Udell, 69-70
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